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ABSTRACT 
 
Households in the U.S. invest a large proportion of wealth in mutual 
funds.  At the end of 2014, open-end mutual fund assets were $16 trillion 
and annual fees exceeded $100 billion.  Mutual funds have a unique 
corporate structure that involves a conflict of interest with the investment 
management firm that creates and manages the fund.  In 1970, Congress 
passed an amendment to the Investment Company Act of 1940 and made 
investment managers fiduciaries with respect to fees charged to captive 
mutual funds.  In 1982, the Federal Court for the Southern District of 
New York, in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt. Inc., established 
a fiduciary standard to determine if fund sponsors violated their 
fiduciary duty with respect to fees. Since 1982, no plaintiff has received 
an award under the 1970 statute. A recent U.S. Supreme Court case, 
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P, confirmed the Gartenberg standard but 
noted that the Gartenberg case lacked “analytical clarity.” This paper 
examines the issues from a new and different perspective and uses micro 
economic analysis to clarify the ambiguities of the decision. The 
Gartenberg standard imposes a very high hurdle for plaintiffs in fee 
cases to overcome. However, in light of the evidence presented here, the 
ability to demonstrate that advisory fees are “so disproportionately large 
that they could not have been the product of arm’s length negotiation” is 
much enhanced.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mutual funds are the repository of a very large proportion of 
household wealth in the United States.  According to the Investment 
Company Fact Book,1 at the end of 2014 open-end mutual fund assets 
                                                          
1 INV. CO. INST., INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF 
TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 
(55th ed. 2015), available at https://perma.cc/9KWA-74JJ. 
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totaled $16 trillion. 46 percent of US households and 90 million 
individuals own mutual funds.  In excess of $7 trillion of Defined 
Contribution and IRA retirement  accounts are invested in mutual funds.  
Investors paid somewhat more than $100 billion in fees to mutual fund 
companies in 2014. Clearly, managing and providing services to mutual 
funds involve large sums of money.  
Mutual funds are created and managed using a unique corporate 
form2.  The typical mutual fund has no employees and owns no physical 
assets or buildings.  In essence, a mutual fund is a collection of contracts 
to provide services to the corporation.  The chief service provider is the 
investment manager who manages the fund’s portfolio of securities. The 
investment manager also creates the fund and the fund is captive of the 
manager.  Investment managers that create and manage mutual funds are 
sometimes referred to as fund sponsors. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “the forces of 
arm’s-length bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry in the 
same manner as they do in other sectors of the American economy.”3  
Being a captive of the fund sponsor, the mutual fund Board of Directors 
faces a monopoly seller of investment advisory services.  This fact colors 
the legitimacy of fees charged to mutual funds. 
During the 1960’s, studies conducted by the Wharton School4 
and the Securities Exchange Commission5 found that the advisory fees 
charged to mutual funds were substantially higher than the fees charged 
to institutional customers for the same services.  The SEC attributed the 
high fees to a lack of arm’s length bargaining and recommended that 
Congress require that fees be “reasonable” and that the requirement be 
enforceable in court. The SEC recommendation presented congress with 
a very visible problem and beginning in 1967 it led to congressional 
hearings.  
                                                          
2 Mutual funds are organized as either corporations or trusts and this 
paper utilizes the terms “directors” and “trustees” to represent the 
controlling power in each. 
3 Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 339 (2010) (quoting S. 
REP. No. 91-184, at 5 (1969)). 
4 WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF 
MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. DOC. NO. 2274, at XII (1962). 
5 SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY 
GROWTH, H.R. REP. NO. 2337, at VIII (1966) [hereinafter, PPI STUDY]. 
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After considerable pushback from the investment management 
industry, in 1970 Congress passed legislation amending the 1940 
Investment Company Act (“ICA”).6   Rather than requiring that fees be 
reasonable, Congress made fund sponsors fiduciaries with respect to the 
fees charged to mutual funds, and it gave investors a private right of 
action7. Congress failed to define a standard to gauge violation of the 
new fiduciary requirement8. This failure combined with a brilliant and 
coordinated legal strategy on the part of the investment management 
industry effectively neutered §36 (b) as a private cause of action.  No 
plaintiff has ever received an award under §36B of the ICA.9 This fact 
alone should cast doubt on the efficacy of investor protection against 
excessive mutual fund fees.  
The legal strategy implemented by the investment management 
industry involved carefully selecting cases brought to trial in order to 
obfuscate the economic analysis of fee differences between mutual fund 
advisory fees and fees actually determined by arm’s length bargaining.  
In Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.,10 the 
basic liability formulation was established:  in order “to face liability 
under Section §36(b), an investment adviser must charge a fee that is so 
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the 
services rendered and could not have been the product of arm's length 
bargaining." This has become known as the “Gartenberg standard”. The 
economic analysis in Gartenberg involved examination of six economic 
“factors” including economies of scale and the profitability of the fund to 
the fund sponsor. These factors were purposefully confused and 
corrupted by the anomalous nature of the money market fund that the 
investment management industry chose to bring to trial.  
                                                          
6 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 through 80a-64. 
7 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (stating, in pertinent part, that an “investment 
adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a 
fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services”). 
8 The language of the ICA §36(b) has been called “ a lesson in the art of 
studied ambiguity of drafting of statutes.” Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 
100, 112 (2d Cir 1981) (quoting JENNINGS & MARSH, SECURITIES 
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS, 1394, 1397 (4th ed. 1977)). 
9 See JAMES D. COX et al., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (4th ed. 2004). 
10 694 F.2d 923, 928-29 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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Freeman and Brown (FB hereinafter)11 updated the Wharton and 
PPI studies and showed that recently, mutual fund investment advisory 
fees continued to be roughly double the fees charged institutional clients 
for the same services.  They hypothesized that the fee differential was 
caused by the lack of competition in the setting of mutual fund advisory 
fees.  This led to a response from the mutual fund industry in the form of 
an article by Coates and Hubbard (CH hereinafter) purporting to show 
that mutual fund fees were effectively determined by market forces and 
thus could not be excessive.12        
The FB and CH disagreement played itself out recently at the 
appellate court level in Jones v Harris 13  where two judges took opposite 
positions on the issue of competition in the mutual fund market.  This 
breach led to Jones v Harris being reviewed in the US Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court essentially affirmed the Gartenberg standard but 
refused to weigh in on the issue of competition in mutual fund markets.  
Justice Alito, in a model of understatement, wrote the following 
concluding lines in the unanimous decision: “The Gartenberg standard, 
…may lack sharp analytical clarity, but…it accurately reflects the 
compromise that is embodied in §36(b), and it has provided a workable 
standard for nearly three decades. The debate…regarding today’s 
mutual fund market is a matter for Congress, not the courts.”  14  
Justice Alito’s reference to a “lack of analytical clarity” is 
consistent with the main thesis of this paper: mutual fund fee litigation is 
tilted in favor of the industry because of tainted and muddled economic 
analysis in the seminal Gartenberg case.   
The purpose of this paper is to bring analytical clarity to the 
economic analysis associated with mutual fund advisory fee litigation via 
a micro-economic analysis of profits, costs and economies of scale in 
Gartenberg and subsequent cases which have established the analytical 
legal precedents. Two broad themes emerge from what follows.  First, 
the genesis of analytical confusion in Gartenberg emanates from the 
unique nature of the mutual fund in that case. The anomalous processing 
costs associated with that fund have confused and corrupted the 
                                                          
11 John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: 
The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 614 (2001). 
12 John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual 
Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 
163 (2007). 
13  527 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2008). 
14  559 U.S. at 336-37. 
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economic analysis of fee cases since 1982. Second, the issues of 
economies of scale and the profitability of fund sponsors will be 
analyzed and it is demonstrated that, contrary to industry assertions, 
mutual funds managers achieve extraordinary profits as the result of 
realizing very substantial economies of scale in the advisory function.  
The paper is structured chronologically. In the next section, 
research by the Wharton School and the SEC is reviewed as is the Senate 
Report underpinning the 1970 amendment to the ICA.  A discussion of 
the “Law of One Price” is included. Next, an analysis of economies of 
scale and the profitability measures applicable to fund sponsors are 
presented as analytical tools.  The Gartenberg case and standard are 
examined in detail.  Three cases subsequent to Gartenberg  which 
refined the  precedent are discussed and reinterpreted based on the 
analytical insights gained in this paper. The FB results are then 
summarized and the FB/CH disagreements highlighted.  Then, recent 
cases, including In Re American Funds 15 and Jones v. Harris are 
reviewed. The paper concludes that the analytical clarity associated with 
the removal of the processing cost canard causes the Gartenberg 
standard to be less formidable.  
 
II. THE 1970 AMENDMENT TO THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT 
 OF 1940 
 
During the 1950’s, the mutual fund industry experienced 
explosive growth, leading the SEC to re-examine the industry for 
potential abuses.  It commissioned the Wharton School of Finance to do 
a comprehensive study of the industry and in 1962 a report was issued to 
Congress. 
 A. The Wharton Study16 
 The issue of advisory fees was foremost in the Wharton report, 
which also dealt with abusive sales load and performance fees.  The 
primary finding of the study as it relates to advisory fees is summarized 
in its Letter of Transmittal: 
                                                          
15 Infra. 
16 Supra note 4, at II. 
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For comparable asset levels, advisory fee rates charged 
mutual funds tend to be substantially higher than those 
charged by the same advisors to the aggregate of their 
other investment companies.  Nevertheless, it was found 
that the expenses involved in advising mutual funds were 
less than those incurred in advising other clients.  
Advisory fee rates of mutual funds also tend to exceed 
substantially the effective management costs of mutual 
funds which do not retain investment advisors.  
Advisory rates to mutual funds were found to be less 
flexible in relation to size of assets managed than rates 
charged other clients…. 
These findings suggest that the special structural 
characteristics of the mutual fund industry, with an 
external advisor closely affiliated with the management 
of the mutual fund, tend to weaken the bargaining 
position of the fund in the establishment of advisory fee 
rates.  Other clients have effective alternatives, and the 
rates charged them are more clearly influenced by the 
force of competition. (Emphasis added). 
The body of the report supports these findings with empirical 
data.  A reasonable interpretation of the Wharton study suggests that in 
1962 mutual funds sold to the public: (1) paid substantially higher 
advisory fees than institutional clients at the same asset level; and (2) had 
mutual fund management expenses lower than the expenses associated 
with institutional clients.  In other words, mutual funds were more 
profitable to investment advisers than institutional clients where the fees 
charged were influenced by the forces of competition 
Another inference is that the cost of managing mutual funds 
decreases as assets increase. However, those savings are not passed along 
to the funds.  In other words, mutual funds are subject to economies of 
scale that are not being reflected in lower fees. Finally, note that the 
report references the industry as a whole. The implication is that excess 
fees are a systemic characteristic of the whole industry, not of just a few 
bad apples.  
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 B. The Law of One Price 
Underlying the Wharton and PPI studies is the assumption that 
mutual fund advisory  fees should reflect competitive pricing if they are 
to be considered reasonable.  Competitive markets, in theory, exist if 
prices satisfy the “Law of One Price,” which posits that in perfectly 
competitive markets, identical assets will sell at identical prices.  In 
competitive markets, a divergence in prices of identical assets will give 
rise to forces that eliminate the price difference.  Speculators will buy 
assets at the lower price, increasing demand, and simultaneously sell 
assets at the higher price, increasing supply, ultimately causing prices to 
converge.  A failure of prices of identical assets to converge may indicate 
a lack of competition.  
Rephrased, the Law of One Price suggests that in competitive 
markets, similar assets should sell for similar prices.  Price differences 
are explained by qualitative and quantitative differences in the assets.  
For instance, in housing markets, one method of valuing properties is to 
examine the selling prices of other homes and adjusting for differences 
such as location, age and the number of bedrooms and baths to estimate 
the value of the property in question. 
Although the Law of One Price is seldom achieved in reality, it 
is often useful to measure competiveness in real world activity.  
Interchangeable commodities at different locations seldom differ in price 
by more than transaction costs (such as fees and transportation costs) 
between locations.  For instance, gold of a given quality sells for the 
same price worldwide; its value at any particular location might be 
different than the world price because of transportation, transaction and 
storage costs.  A barrel of crude oil at the well head in west Texas will 
sell at a similar price to North Sea crude oil, adjusted for quality 
differences (sulfur content, for example) and transportation costs.  
The issue of price differences of similar assets or services boils 
down to considerations about the competitiveness, or lack thereof, of the 
markets involved and the similarities or differences in the good or 
service being priced.  The Wharton and PPI studies conclude that 
differences in the services provided by mutual fund managers are 
insufficient to explain the differences in the fees charged to investors.  
Accordingly, the significantly higher fees charged to mutual fund 
investors result from an inability to negotiate the fees at arm’s-length.  
Why?  Because the mutual fund is essentially captive of the fund sponsor 
9
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while institutional portfolio fees are determined competitively.  Studies 
do not argue that the investment management services are exactly 
identical in each case, but the differences are too small to explain the 
large discrepancies in fees.  Thus, the Wharton report finds substantial 
fee differences, and attributes the differences principally to the lack of 
arm’s-length negotiation of fees. 
 
C. The S.E.C. Report on the Public Policy Implications of              
Investment Company Growth 
 
The PPI Study focused on the lack of arm’s-length negotiation of 
investment  advisoy fees, and reached three main conclusions about 
externally managed fund fees: 
 
1. Most of the advisory fee reduction since 1960 had 
occurred as a result of pressure generated by the 
Wharton report and the majority of reductions were the 
result of fee litigation settlements.  
2. Fees on externally managed funds were far higher 
than fees on internally managed or bank managed 
funds.17 
3. Fees on externally managed mutual funds were far 
less sensitive to assets levels than internally managed 
and bank managed funds.  
The S.E.C.’s Letter of Transmittal to Congress recommended: 
                                                          
17 The Commission found that the median annual advisory fee rate of .48 
percent of 57 externally managed funds was 4 times or more than that of 
the advisory fees of the internally managed complexes examined. The 
Commission also examined the fee schedules for pension and profit 
sharing plans for seven leading banks and found that the annual advisory 
fee for a $100 million portfolio for five of the six banks was .06 percent 
(6 basis points), which was less than one eighth of the 50 basis points 
charged to mutual funds of that size. The fee on the seventh bank was 7 
basis points.  
10
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The report concludes that mutual fund shareholders need 
protection against incurring excessive costs in … 
management of their investments and that, given the 
structure and incentives prevailing in the industry, 
neither competition nor the few elementary safeguards 
against conflict of interest deemed sufficient in 1940 and 
contained in the Investment Company Act presently 
provide this protection in adequate measure.  
 
It is recommended that the statute be amended to 
expressly require that the compensation received by 
persons affiliated with investment companies, including 
their management organizations, for services furnished 
to an investment company be reasonable, and that this 
standard be enforceable in the courts.  
 
 
The S.E.C.’s recommendation that the courts establish a 
reasonableness standard for management fees was criticized by the 
industry as similar to public utility rate regulation.  Rate regulation is 
imposed on natural monopolies such as electric and water utilities.  
 
 D. The 1970 Amendment to the ICA Act of 1940 
 
Subsequent to the publication of the PPI Study, there was 
extensive pushback from trade groups, and in particular, the Investment 
Company Institute (ICI), the investment management trade association.  
The ICI and others argued for self-regulation and sought relief from a 
raft of litigation they believed was plaguing the industry.  
The initial 1967 legislation failed and with it the 
“reasonableness” standard recommended for fees.  After extensive 
hearings and debate, legislation was passed in 1970 and the final 
legislation, while acknowledging the conflict of interest problem and 
paying lip service to “reform,” essentially ratified the status quo, which 
prevails even today.  
The Senate Report accompanying the legislation gives a good 
flavor of the overall legislative intent and provides:  
 
11
Brown: Mutual Fund Advisory Fee Litigation: Some Analytical Clarity
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2016
340 Journal of Business & Securities Law [Vol. 16 
In reporting this bill, your committee recognizes the 
importance of permitting adequate compensation and 
incentives so that men of ability and integrity will 
continue to be attracted to the mutual fund industry.  At 
the same time this bill recognizes that investors should 
share equitably, as they do in other areas, in the 
economies available as a result of the growth and general 
acceptance of mutual funds.  
[Y]our committee has decided that there is an adequate 
basis to delete the express statutory requirement of 
‘reasonableness,’ and to substitute a different method of 
testing management compensation. This bill states that 
the mutual fund investment advisor has a specific 
‘fiduciary’ duty in respect to management fee 
compensation.18  
This then is the “compromise” later suggested by Justice Alito in 
the Jones case.  The industry did not get self-regulation, and the SEC did 
not get its reasonableness standard.  It is clear that the overarching intent 
was to ratify the status quo, as made eminently clear by the last 
paragraph of the management fee section of the Report: 
 
This provision does not represent a finding by the 
committee as to the level of fees of the industry.  Your 
committee does not believe itself qualified to make such 
judgments.  Nor is it contemplated that the Commission 
will seek a general reduction of fees on an industry wide 
basis.  
Curiously, the committee did not feel qualified to make 
judgments concerning advisory  fee levels - but was willing to ignore 
both the findings of the S.E.C., its own securities watchdog, and the 
Wharton Report, a prestigious Ivy League business school - in making its 
recommendations.   
The overall message from the Senate is essentially a repudiation 
of the Wharton and PPI reports and nowhere is reference made to the 
finding of “substantial” industry wide differences between mutual fund  
                                                          
18 S. REP. NO. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 4-6 (1969) (emphasis 
added). 
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and institutional advisory fees.  The evidence was simply ignored.  As 
the Senate opined in its Report, “Nor is it contemplated that the 
Commission will seek a general reduction of fees on an industry wide 
basis.” Thus, even though the Commission theoretically had standing to 
sue under the new law, its powers were essentially neutered from the 
start. 
Aside from a fleeting reference to “share equitably” and other 
comments on economies of scale, the interests of the public and investors 
are essentially ignored, while other statements favored the industry: 
 
1.  The Investment advisor is entitled to make a profit.  
Nothing in the bill is intended to imply otherwise or to 
suggest that a cost-plus type of contract would be 
required. 
2.  This section should not be taken as reflecting any 
finding that the present level of management fees or that 
of any particular advisor is too high. 
3.  This section is not intended to authorize a court to 
substitute its business judgment for that of the mutual 
fund’s board of directors in the area of management fees.  
Finally, the enacted legislation provides only a one year look-
back damage period.  This effectively limited monetary penalties, 
reduced any serious deterrent effect, and ignored the general principle 
that the damages period should conform to the period of wrongdoing. 
Thus, even if an investment manager violated fiduciary duties, their 
exposure to damages was curtailed. 
Congress thus bypassed any real definition of fiduciary standards 
and instead handed the problem off to the judiciary.  The problem with 
establishing standards, reasonable or otherwise, is that they must be 
ultimately tied to numbers and relationships existing in the real world.  
Congress essentially ignored persuasive evidence of substantial 
overcharging by investment managers. However numbers do not lie; 
honest accounting translates into inconvenient truths and the 
overcharging documented by the S.E.C. and Wharton Reports did not 
disappear.  The judiciary was able to ignore those real-world facts with 
substantial complicity from the mutual fund industry, and the 
congressional desire to maintain the status quo was achieved.  Much 
13
Brown: Mutual Fund Advisory Fee Litigation: Some Analytical Clarity
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2016
342 Journal of Business & Securities Law [Vol. 16 
later, the judicial solution to the numbers problem – which was, in fact, 
no solution at all - gave rise to the lack of analytical clarity noted by 
Justice Alito in Jones.   
 
III. FUND PROFITABILITY AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
The advisory fee is one component of the expense ratio; a 
percentage number charged against  fund assets on an annual basis. The 
investment management contract is an asset of the fund sponsor and 
potentially produces dollar profits. Confusion and misinformation 
surrounds the concepts of the profitability of an individual fund to the 
fund sponsor and the associated economies of scale. This section 
attempts to explain the issues in a simple, clear and intuitive fashion, to 
serve as a basis for understanding these concepts in the case law.  
  
A. The Expense Ratio 
 
The expense ratio is typically comprised of three components: 
(1) the investment management or advisory fee; (2) the distribution fee; 
and (3) administrative fees.  A typical expense ratio breakdown would be 
.5 (or half a percent) investment management fee, .25 (a quarter of one 
percent) distribution fee, and .25 (again, a quarter of one percent) 
administrative fee.  The focus of this article is the first component, the 
advisory fee.  However, the third component –  administrative fees - is 
the sum of several other components, each typically representing a 
separate contract for services paid by the fund.  Such contracts vary from 
fund to fund but typically include items such as transfer agent fees, 
custodial fees, board fees and audit fees. 
Typically, the largest component of administrative fees is the 
transfer agent (“TA”) fee; it is the TA which “keeps the books” on the 
shareholders.  It keeps track of purchases and sales, and it distributes 
dividends, among other functions.  The TA contract is usually separate 
from the investment advisory contract, although the TA is often a 
subsidiary of the investment adviser.  Importantly, the TA insulates the 
investment adviser from shareholders.  The only real interaction between 
the two is that, at the end of each business day, the TA tallies net 
purchases and sales and then communicates this number to the 
investment adviser, who adjusts the portfolio accordingly.   
The investment advisory fee is determined by a contract between 
the fund and the adviser, and it is approved by the trustees. The greater 
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the fee, the more profitable the contract is to the owners of the advisory 
firm, and since this fee is paid from fund assets, the higher the fee, the 
lower the investment return to fund shareholders. This is the essence of 
the conflict of interest: the fund is a captive of the investment adviser, 
which has an interest in maximizing fees charged to the fund, which are 
in turn paid by the fund shareholders. 
The investment adviser incurs various costs which supposedly 
justify the advisory fee.  These include salaries for portfolio managers, 
research costs, office expenses, computers, and other miscellaneous 
costs.  A key to understanding whether the advisory fee is fair is the 
profitability of the contract (revenues less costs); profitability of the fund 
to the fund sponsor is intimately related to economies of scale.  
Intuitively, the investment advisory function should benefit from such 
economies: once the fund’s basic infrastructure is in place, it does not 
cost substantially more to manage a $1 billion fund than it would cost to 
manage a $100 million fund.  Scalability as used in this paper is 
synonymous with economies of scale.   
 
B. Profit Margin – A Measure of Profitability 
 
A generic formula for calculating a profit margin is:  (sales – 
costs)/sales, with the numerator as a measure of profits (sales – costs) 
and the denominator as sales.  The profit margin is a percentage number 
that represents profit as a percent of sales.   
There are different definitions of profit margin depending on the 
costs examined, so there are also differently labeled profit margins. 
Generically, the Gross Profit Margin (“GPM”) is defined as (sales – cost 
of goods sold)/sales.  In this case, the numerator is Gross Profit, or profit 
after costs directly associated with the sales are deducted.  This measure 
of profitability may be calculated on product line, division or whole firm 
basis.   
In a mutual fund context, the GPM is a measure of the 
profitability of the fund to the fund sponsor and is calculated as 
(Revenues – Direct Fund Expenses)/ Revenues.  Direct fund expenses 
are those costs that are directly attributed to the fund such as portfolio 
manager salaries, research costs and computers. GPM at the fund level 
excludes corporate overhead and other costs not directly attributable to 
the sponsor’s cost of operating the fund.   
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The Pre-Tax, or Operating Profit Margin (OPM), is a more 
commonly used profit measure. Like the GPM, the OPM may be 
calculated at the product line, division or whole firm level, and it 
measures profitability, including all expenses (with the exception of 
taxes). The OPM at the individual fund level was discussed as the 
measure of profit in the seminal case of Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime 
Reserve Fund, Inc., which in a precedent setting opinion established a 
maximum profit margin of approximately 75 percent.19  
Common usage in the industry is to label the individual fund 
OPM as the Advisory Margin.  It is calculated as:  (Revenue – (Direct 
Fund Expenses + Allocated Corporate Overhead))/ Revenue.  Revenue 
associated with the Advisory Margin is the average level of fund assets 
for the period in question, times the percentage investment management 
fee.  Advisory Margin data is proprietary in nature and seldom available 
outside of the litigation process, where it is invariably subject to strict 
confidentiality agreements.  However, some summary data, which cannot 
be attributed to individual firms or funds, is available and discussed 
below.  
OPMs at the firm level are commonly available for publicly 
traded firms, and OPMs for fund sponsors at the firm level are on 
average lower than Advisory Margins. This occurs because fund 
sponsors typically have product lines other than just fund sponsorship.  
These often include subsidiaries or product lines that provide distribution 
and transfer agent services. Moreover, many fund sponsors are 
subsidiaries of large banks and insurance companies, and their fund 
sponsorship profits are aggregated into other product lines. 
 
 C. Economies of Scale 
 
Economies of scale occur when the average cost of production 
decreases as the scale of production increases; when fixed costs are 
spread around more units of production.  For instance, a factory that 
produces widgets and costs a million dollars in fixed costs to run a year 
has a per-widget cost of $1 million, if the factory produces only one 
widget.  On the other hand, if the factory produces a million widgets and 
costs $1 million to run, the fixed cost per widget is one dollar.  If the 
factory manages to produce over a million widgets, the cost per widget 
correspondingly decreases, reflecting an economy of scale.  Of course, 
                                                          
19 663 F. Supp. 962, 990 (S.D.N.Y 1987). 
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there are other (variable) costs associated with increased production, but 
in general, the more efficient the production, the less cost per unit.   
When investment management functions are analyzed under an 
economies of scale rationale, it becomes clear that costs should fall as the 
level of assets under management increases. 
 D. A Hypothetical Cost Curve 
To gain insight into the nature of economies of scale in a mutual 
fund context, a hypothetical cost curve is here constructed. There is 
empirical evidence that the breakeven level of assets required for a 
standalone mutual fund is in the neighborhood of $100 million. 20 
Breakeven occurs when revenues and costs are equal; there are no profits 
but also no losses. Assuming the investment management fee is a flat 1 
percent (or 100 basis points), a 1 percent fee on $100 million would 
generate revenues of $1 million, and assuming costs or expenses of $1 
million, there are no profits or losses. 
As shown in the chart below as Exhibit 1, as the level of assets 
increase, assuming economies of scale, costs as a percentage of assets 
will decline. Here, the hypothetical cost curve is calibrated to generate a 
75% profit margin at a $5 billion level of assets under management21.  In 
order to achieve this, it was assumed that variable costs increased by 
$234,694 for every extra $100 million under management.  This 
generated total costs of $12.5 million at an asset level of $5 billion; this 
was comprised of $1 million of fixed costs and a total of $11.5 million of 
variable costs. So, with assets of $5 billion and a fee of 1%, revenue 
would be $50 million, costs $12.5 million, and the Profit Margin would 
be (50-12.5)/50 = 75%.  
 
                                                          
20 MELINDA GERBER, START A SUCCESSFUL MUTUAL FUND: THE STEP-
BY-STEP REFERENCE GUIDE TO MAKE IT HAPPEN, (JV Books, 2005); see 
also MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE CONSULTING, 
https://perma.cc/7YB5-5WBM. 
21 The particulars of the hypothetical cost curve are unimportant. If 
breakeven is $50 million or $150 million or if a 75 percent profit margin 
is realized at $3 billion or $7 billion of assets, the fundamental analysis 
and insights remain unchanged. 
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The graph identifies costs as a percentage of assets at various 
points on the curve, C1 to C5. As the level of assets increases from 
breakeven ($100 million) to $6 billion, the percentage costs decrease, but 
not in a linear (straight line) fashion.  Costs decrease most dramatically 
from breakeven to about $1 billion.  After that, the cost curve flattens out 
so that high asset levels, the decrease in percentage cost is much less 
pronounced.  Consider the section of the cost curve from $100 million to 
$1 billion (C1 to C2), reflecting substantial economies of scale.  But 
economies of scale are modest when examining the decrease in costs for 
subsections of the curve at higher levels of assets. 
Economists have developed a numerical measure to quantify 
economies of scale, called the “scale factor.”  It is calculated by dividing 
the percentage change in dollar costs by the percentage change in output 
over a range of output. In the case of mutual funds, output is the level of 
assets under management.  If dollar costs do not increase percentage wise 
as rapidly as assets, the scale factor will be less than one.  Conversely, if 
dollar costs increase much more slowly than assets, the scale factor will 
0.0%
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be well below one, and closer to zero.  If there are minimal economies of 
scale, the factor will be less than (but close to) one22.   
The Table below is a compilation of the scale factors over a 
range of assets for four sub-portions of the curve, as well as the whole 
curve. When examining sub-portions of the curve, economies of scale are 
labelled as “marginal” and when measuring economies of scale from 
breakeven, economies of scale are labeled as “realized.”  
The smallest scale factors (the greatest realized economies of 
scale) are associated with the portions of the curve from breakeven 
forward23 (realized economies of scale).  Scale factors close to one are 
associated with the flat portions of the curve, labeled as marginal 
economies of scale.  
The most important insight from this Table is that the measured 
level of economies of scale depends on the portion of the cost curve 
examined. Examination of the range of output from breakeven forward 
reveals large economies, while sub-portions of the curve suggest minimal 
economies.    
 
 
                                                          
22 Dollar costs that increase percentage-wise more than output are an 
indication of diseconomies of scale and generate a scale factor greater 
than one. 
23 The fact that scale factors from breakeven forward are constant in the 
table is an artifact of the assumptions used to construct the cost curve. 
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E. The Relationship between Profit Margins and 
Economies of Scale 
 
Advisory margins and economies of scale are related.  As 
economies of scale are realized (costs decrease as a percent of assets), 
advisory margins increase.  It is impossible to realize a positive advisory 
margin without simultaneously realizing a decrease in percentage costs, 
thus realizing economies of scale. The relationship may be demonstrated 
with the use of the following graph, Exhibit 2, which plots profit margins 
on the same charts as costs: 
  
Scale Factors and Profit Margins for Hypothetical Cost Curve 
$Costsbeg $Costsend $Assetsbeg $Assetsend Scale 
Factor 
 
Profit 
Margin 
Marginal Economies of Scale* 
C1 to C2 $1,000,000  $3,112,245  $100,000,000  $1,000,000,000  0.235 68.9% 
C2 to C3 $3,112,245  $10,153,061  $1,000,000,000  $4,000,000,000  0.754 
C3 to C4 $10,153,061  $12,500,000  $4,000,000,000  $5,000,000,000  0.925 
C4 to C5 $12,500,000  $14,846,939  $5,000,000,000  $6,000,000,000  0.939 
Realized Economies of Scale 
C1 to C3 $1,000,000  $10,153,061  $100,000,000  $4,000,000,000  0.235 74.6% 
C1 to C4 $1,000,000  $12,500,000  $100,000,000  $5,000,000,000  0.235 75.0% 
C1 to C5 $1,000,000  $14,846,939  $100,000,000  $6,000,000,000  0.235 75.3% 
*Economies of Scale from Breakeven to $1 Billion are both Marginal and Realized EOS.  
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This graph and the underlying relationship show that advisory 
margins are intimately related to economies of scale and as scale 
economies are realized (i.e. costs as a percentage of assets decrease), 
profits as a percentage of assets (and revenues) also increase.  The exact 
relationship illustrated above assumes that fees are a constant one percent 
of assets under management.  The proposition holds in general but will 
not hold exactly if breakpoints are included in the fee schedule.24 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 The mathematically astute will note that the profit margin is one minus 
percentage costs and vice versa. Also, the scale factor is always less than 
percentage costs expressed as a decimal. This is true when fees are a 
constant percentage of assets. When breakpoints are present in the fee 
schedule, the scale factor will be less than the calculated scale factor.  
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 F. Profit Margins - Empirical Evidence 
Advisory margins on individual funds are proprietary in nature 
and are generally disclosed only subject to strict confidentiality 
agreements in litigation.  However, a consulting firm named Mutual 
Fund Governance Consulting (“MFGC”), which provides services to 
fund trustees, publishes research reports that sometimes include 
summary advisory margin numbers (and other data) aggregated across 
several firms.25  Three MFGC reports are of particular interest here: 
 
“MFGC A”: Profitability Benchmarks in Contract Renewal – April 
2008;26 
 
“MFGC B”:  Industry Profitability Returns as Average Assets Rise in 
2010;27 and 
 
“MFGC C”: Advisory Fee Breakpoints: A new Look at the Data – 
February 2012.28 
 
Several observations can be distilled from these three reports: 
 
1.  Average complex wide Advisory Margins were about 
56% in 2008 (MFGC A) and ranged between about 50 
and 60% between 2005 and 2010 (MFGC B).  
2.  Average operating margins at the firm level were 
around 31% and ranged from about 28 to 34% between 
2005 and 2010 (MFGC B).   
                                                          
25 MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE CONSULTING, https://perma.cc/8NW5-
328J. 
26 C. Meyrick Payne & Sara Yerkey, Profitability Benchmarks in 
Contract Renewal, MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE CONSULTING (Apr. 
2008), https://perma.cc/2QRH-LM2B. 
27 C. Meyrick Payne & Sara Yerkey, Industry Profitability Returns as 
Average Assets Rise in 2010, MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE 
CONSULTING (2010), https://perma.cc/43GB-CUHH. 
28 Sara Yerkey, Advisory Fee Breakpoints: A New Look at the Data, 
MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE CONSULTING (Feb. 2012), 
https://perma.cc/DYL7-PNLB. 
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 3.  Some types of funds are more profitable than others 
(MFGC A):  Large Cap Equity and Money Market funds 
had average Advisory Margins of about 70%, while 
bond and small cap equity funds had margins from 40 to 
50%.  
4.  Equity funds are the most likely to have breakpoints, 
and the bigger the fund, the lower the resulting 
percentage advisory fee (MFGC C). 
5.  MFGC A and MFGC B mention the 77% maximum 
permissible Advisory Margin established in the Schuyt, 
case, supra, although MFGC B mistakenly attributes it 
to the Gartenberg decision. 
 
 G. Three Propositions 
 
Given the relationship between profit margins and economies of 
scale, and the empirical evidence on margins, some useful insights 
concerning margins and economies of scale emerge.  
 
 i. Proposition 1:  There are Large Scale Economies in the    
    Mutual Fund Investment Advisory Function 
 
Economies of scale exist and are substantial in the portfolio management 
process. The above evidence shows that advisory margins are 
mathematically related to realized economies of scale, and empirically 
margins are between 50 and 60% on average.29  Based on these facts it 
cannot be disputed that the investment advisory function of the fund 
sponsor business realizes substantial economies of scale. This evidence 
supports statements by industry pioneer John Bogle who has said that 
“there are staggering economies of scale in portfolio management and 
research.”30 
                                                          
29 Payne & Yerkey, supra note 25 (demonstrating that advisory margins 
of 60 percent would be associated with a realized scale factor of about .4 
or smaller). 
30 JOHN C. BOGLE, THE JOHN C. BOGLE READER: COMMON SENSE ON 
MUTUAL FUNDS (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 10th ed. 2010). 
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 ii. Proposition 2:  Case Law is Predicated on Misleading 
and     Deceptive Economies of Scale Considerations 
The United States Senate Report, as explained above, endorsed 
the concept that fund sponsors share equitably the fruits of economies of 
scale.  The issues in case law revolve around how to measure economies 
of scale and what constitutes an equitable sharing of economies. In 
practice the two issues have been improperly conflated with a misleading 
measure of scale economies as an indication of an equitable sharing of 
economies.   To illustrate these concepts, assume that a fund with a cost 
curve like that in Exhibit 1 currently has $4 billion in assets under 
management. Its financial condition is identical to point C3 above: 
 
Assets     $4 Billion 
Revenues (1%)   $40 Million 
Costs     $10.15 Million 
Profits    $29.85 Million 
Profit Margin   74.6% 
Now, consider a scenario where the fund sponsor expects assets 
to increase to $5 billion in the future, and the Trustees are urging the 
fund sponsor to add breakpoints (which would serve to reduce fees) 
because of expected economies of scale.  Assume that the fund sponsor 
argues that at $4 billion in assets, economies of scale have been 
practically exhausted since economies of scale going forward (marginal 
EOS) are minimal because the cost curve is flat.31  Assume further that 
the fund sponsor prevails and no breakpoints are imposed on the fund. 
The financial condition of the fund when assets increase to $5 billion (a 
situation identical to point C4 above) would be:  
 
 
                                                          
31 The scale factor from C3to C4is .925 which is consistent with minimal 
economies of scale over that portion of the cost curve.  
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Assets    $5 Billion 
Revenues   $50 Million 
 
Costs    $12.5 Million 
 
Profits    $37.5 Million 
 
Profit Margin   75% 
 
Even though the profit margin only increased slightly, from 74.6 
to 75%, dollar profits increased by 25.6 % from $29.85 million to $37.5 
million - an increase of $7.65 million. The Trustees’ acceptance of a 
misleading measure of scale economies led to a profit windfall to the 
fund sponsor.  There was no equitable sharing of the increase in dollar 
profits resulting from economies of scale and in essence Trustees were 
duped by the fund sponsor.   
The proper measure of economies of scale should be the 
realized, not marginal economies of scale.  The Senate clearly intended 
that economies of scale should be shared, but utilization of marginal 
economies of scale leads to a contrary result.  Unfortunately, the case law 
has evolved to support the use of marginal economies of scale in 
litigation rather than realized economies of scale, as illustrated below.   
 iii. Proposition 3:  Profit Margin Ceilings and Flat Cost        
     Curves Induce Only Modest Fee Reductions 
 
Due to the flatness of the cost curve at high asset levels, only 
moderate fee rate reductions are necessary to keep profit margins under 
fiduciary standard ceilings.  This proposition can be illustrated as 
follows.  
Imagine an investment manager who faces the hypothetical cost 
curve illustrated above, with assets under management at $5 billion, and 
a current profit margin of 75%. The manager’s total revenues are $50 
million (.01 times $5 billion) and the associated profits are $37.5 million 
(at a 75% profit margin).  
Now, assume that the manager is anticipating an increase in 
assets of $1 billion to $6 billion.  On the hypothetical cost curve this is 
equivalent of movement from C4 to C5. This will generate total revenues 
of $60 million and a profit of $45.15 million, an increase of $7.65 
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million.  However, because of economies of scale, the profit margin is 
now actually about 75.3% (rounded) 3 basis points above the statutory 
maximum of 75%. The profit margin increased only moderately because 
of the flatness of the cost curve.  
If the investment manager institutes a 5 basis point fee break (to 
95 basis points) on all assets above $5 billion, then the revenues on the 
extra $1 billion in assets would be $9.5 million and the profit margin 
would then be (59.5-14.85)/59.5, or 75%.  Customers would get a $.5 
million fee break and the investment manager would get to keep $9.5 
million of the revenues, which does not appear to be equitable.     
 
IV. GARTENBERG 32 
 
Professor Donald Langevoort33 has pointed out that the late 60’s 
and 70’s were generally favorable to investors in litigation against fund 
sponsors.  Gradually, however, the judicial landscape shifted, with the 
Supreme Court’s pivotal 1979 decision in Burks v. Lasker.34  Subsequent 
to Burks, courts used the supposedly “disinterested” directors as a pretext 
to reduce the level of judicial scrutiny afforded to allegations of breach 
of fiduciary duty.  The scrutiny of independent directors was key in the 
Gartenberg decision and became one of what came to be known as the 
“Gartenberg factors.”  
Twelve years elapsed between the passage of the 1970 Amendment 
to the ICA and Gartenberg, but in the interim, the industry disposed of 
six fee-related cases filed under the ICA: 
 
 Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 1976 WL 775 (S.D. N.Y. 1976). 
o Settled out of court with stipulations, after litigation and 
appeals. 
 Halligan v. Standard & Poor’s/Intercapital, Inc., 434 F.Supp. 
1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). 
o Motion to dismiss was denied and no more proceedings 
on file:  presumably settled. 
                                                          
32 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 
1982). 
33Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties 
in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the 
Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1030–32 
(2005).  
34 441 U.S. 471 (1979).   
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 Untermeyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust, 25 Fed.R.Serv.2d 
1471 (D. Mass. 1978).   
o Case dismissal overturned by the appellate court and 
remanded; no further proceedings mentioned.  
Presumably settled following appeal. 
 Krasner v. Dreyfus Corporation, 500 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
o Settment approved July,1981. 
 Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
o Initially complaints dismissed due to procedural issues 
and not reinstated or refiled; presumably settled or 
abandoned. 
 Lerner v. Reserve Management Co., 1981 WL 1641 (S.D. NY. 
1981). 
o Dismissed on res judicata grounds, citing Boyko, supra.   
 
Gartenberg, which came to trial in 1980, posed a problem 
because the fund at issue was not representative of mutual funds in 
general.  This worked to the advantage of the industry, because the court 
did not have to confront difficult facts, such as a comparison of small 
fees charged to institutional clients, and the extraordinarily high profit 
margins of fund sponsors.  The problems were compounded because of 
the District Court’s interpretation of legislative intent, which has sown 
confusion and limited clarity in subsequent ICA fee cases.  The net effect 
is that because of the unique nature of the fund at issue, the Second 
Circuit’s distillation of the Gartenberg factors were badly corrupted and 
distorted.  Moreover, given the limited facts the District Court did 
confront, it was unable to apply its own factors to properly analyze the 
fund in question.  It was left to subsequent courts to refine the 
Gartenberg factors, and they did so in a way that was very unfavorable 
to investors.   
Gartenberg35 filed the case against Merrill Lynch, Merrill Lynch 
Asset Management and the Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust. The 
Ready Assets Trust was a money market mutual fund that was integrated 
with Merrill Lynch Brokerage operations.   
 
 
                                                          
35 Gartenberg, 694 F.2d 923. 
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A. The Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust  
 
The 1970’s were a period of financial turmoil, leading to 
deregulation of the financial system.  The Merrill Lynch Ready Assets 
Trust played a catalytic roll in these events.  The Vietnam War led to 
deficit spending, high inflation, high interest rates and disintermediation 
out of the banking system.  At the time, banks were prohibited from 
paying interest on checking accounts, and there were ceilings on rates 
paid on savings accounts.  With interest rates high because of inflation, 
Merrill Lynch produced a striking financial innovation, and in 1977, 
married a money market fund, the Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust, 
with brokerage accounts.  This allowed customers to write checks paid 
from their money market accounts.36  Of course, the money market fund 
paid market interest rates which were well over ten percent at the time.  
At a stroke, the fund was paying market rates of interest on what 
was functionally a checking account.  Dividends and interest paid into 
the brokerage account from stocks and bonds were automatically swept 
into the Ready Assets Trust and immediately earned market rates of 
interest.  Moreover, the proceeds from sales of stocks and bonds were 
also immediately swept into the fund.  The Ready Assets Trust, the first 
money fund associated with a brokerage firm, experienced phenomenal 
growth and, as noted on page 6 of the Gartenberg opinion:  “In June 
1978 there was a total of about 6.8 billion of assets in money market 
funds; today (1981) their assets total more than $185 billion - a 25 fold 
growth. The fund herein is by far the largest money market fund in 
existence.” 
These events pre-dated the computer revolution that swept the 
brokerage industry a few years later, and at the time, Merrill Lynch 
transactions were still largely paper based.  If a customer wanted to buy a 
stock, the broker took the order over the phone and filled out a trade 
ticket.  A clerk electronically entered the ticket and wired the transaction 
to the trading floor where it was executed.  In cash management accounts 
(“CMAs”), each stock transaction generated an equal and opposite 
money fund transaction:  when the broker filled out a stock trade ticket, 
he/she would automatically enter a trade ticket to correspondingly credit 
or debit (depending on the stock trade) the money fund. 
Merrill Lynch, in its internal accounting procedures, allowed the 
brokerage operation to bill the money fund for the processing costs, and 
                                                          
36 The “Cash Management Account”, as it was known, also included a 
Visa Debit card and had a required minimum balance of $20,000. 
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it conducted internal time and motion studies to estimate the incremental 
expenses involved.37  Merrill Lynch was motivated to bill those costs to 
the money fund because without the processing costs, the gross profit 
margin on the fund would have been much higher - perhaps as high as 
96% - and the fund’s board would have undoubtedly pushed for more 
breakpoints and lower fees.38  Thus, Merrill Lynch sought to attribute all 
processing costs to the Ready Assets Trust. 
   
 B. The District Court’s Interpretation of Legislative Intent 
was       Erroneous 
 
The Court’s interpretation of the statute’s legislative intent 
closely mirrored the Senate Report, with a few notable but important 
exceptions, summarized below:   
 
The Intention of the Legislation39 
 
1. What is intended: 
(a) That the investment adviser is 
entitled to make a profit. 
2. What is not intended: 
(a) That a cost-plus type of contract is 
required. 
(b) That general concepts of rate 
regulation as applies to public utilities 
are to be introduced. 
(c) That the standard of “corporate 
                                                          
37  See Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 931 (referenced therein as the “Fitz-
Gerald estimate”). 
38 See id. at 931 n. 4. For the fiscal year of June of 1980 to June of 1981, 
the fund had average assets of $13.52 billion and revenues of 
$39,369,587. The schedule shows direct costs (exclusive of processing 
costs) of $1,567,847.  ((39,369,587-1,567,847)/39,369,587 yields a gross 
profit margin of 96%.) The plaintiffs brought these figures to the 
attention of the Appellate Court, to no avail. 
39 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1046 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
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waste” is to be applied. 
(d) That management fees should be 
tested on whether they are “reasonable”. 
(e) That a congressional finding has 
been made that the present industry 
level or that the fee    of any particular 
adviser is too high. 
(f) That the Court is authorized to 
substitute its business judgment for that 
of the directors. 
(g) That the responsibility for 
management is to be shifted from 
directors to the judiciary. 
(h) That economies of scale are 
necessarily applicable at every stage 
of growth of the Fund. 
3. The test of fairness is to be made by 
the Court, in part: 
(a) By reference to industry practice. 
(b) By reference to industry level of 
management fees. 
4. The Court shall determine whether: 
(c)  The attention of directors was fixed 
on their responsibilities. 
(d) The directors requested and obtained 
information reasonably necessary to 
evaluate the terms of the management 
contract. 
(e) The directors having the primary 
responsibility for looking after the best 
interests of the Fund's shareholders, 
have evaluated such information 
accordingly. 
 
While this recitation appears faithful to the legislation’s intent, 
attention should be paid to 2(h), and 3(a) and (b).  The Senate Report 
voiced concern about economies of scale being equitably shared with 
shareholders, yet, the Gartenberg court opined that the legislation was 
not intended to imply that “economies of scale are necessarily applicable 
to every stage of growth of the fund.”  A search for any statement 
remotely related to this assertion through the Senate Report  as well as 
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the related hearings, would be in vain. The Gartenberg court’s language 
regarding economies of scale is very different from the actual language 
in the Senate Report, and  has had a pernicious influence on the ability of 
plaintiffs to prevail in mutual fund fee cases.  The industry has been able 
to argue that economies of scale measured from high levels of assets and 
“going forward” are minimal, even though profit margins and dollar 
profits are high once scale economies have been realized. The impact has 
been analytical confusion as it relates to economies of scale which has 
been invoked to benefit mutual fund defendants in fee cases. 
Similarly, Gartenberg suggests that industry practice and fees as 
a fairness test is not supported by the facts. A search through all of the 
hearings and reports reveals no reference to industry practice as it relates 
to fee levels. There is no mention of the “industry level of management 
fees” with a sole exception, in the last paragraph of the Senate Report: 
 
This provision does not represent a finding by the 
committee as to the level of fees in the industry. Your 
committee does not believe itself qualified to make such 
judgments. Nor is it contemplated that the Commission 
will seek a general reduction of fees on an industry wide 
basis.  
 
Essentially, the Gartenberg court found that the proper gauge of 
fiduciary fairness of a no-bid  fee contract was the industry level of other 
no-bid contracts. Judge Pollack wrote: “The compensation paid by the 
fund is high as a matter of numbers but the payment is lawful relative to 
the gargantuan size of the fund…The plaintiffs have not sustained their 
burden of proof…that the fees received should be characterized as a 
breach of fiduciary duty.” 40  The court then made a whole series of 
judgments, including the comparison of management fees to 
management fees of other money funds, but was unable to reach a 
definitive conclusion on two of the six eventual “Gartenberg factors” set 
out by the Appellate Court. The undetermined factors were the 
profitability of the fund and economies of scale. In both instances, the 
District Court was confounded by processing costs.  The District Court 
failed to establish any bright line test associated with these items, a 
burden was left to a subsequent court. 
                                                          
40 Id. at 1068. 
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 C. The Fee Paid 
 
The District Court found that the average fee paid by Ready 
Assets Trust customers “compared favorably with others in the industry” 
as less than .29 percent, thus the ratio of expenses to average net assets 
was deemed “in line.”  At least sixteen other funds had higher expense 
ratios while only five had lower ratios.”41  The District Court thus found 
the fee “in line” even though at the time of trial, the fund had “triple” the 
net assets of the next largest fund not sponsored by Merrill Lynch. The 
finding of those fees as “in line” - in spite of what the Court 
characterized as “gargantuan” assets - totally ignores the concept of 
economies of scale. 
 
 D. The Fund’s Profitability to the Adviser 
The District Court chose to look at net earnings after taxes 
resulting from sponsoring and operating the Ready Assets Trust.  Net 
earnings are dollar figures and thus, by their nature, preclude comparison 
with different sized funds.  A more accurate analysis would consider 
percentage profits.  
The Plaintiffs contended that only the direct costs associated 
with the fund should be considered in determining the fairness of the fee.  
The Court ruled that the associated processing costs were to be 
considered in determining net income.  The Court considered three order 
processing costs, ranging from $2 to $7.5 per order.  The Fitzgerald 
estimate of $2 per order was a marginal cost estimated internally by 
Merrill Lynch prior to the litigation.42  The Deimer and PMM (Peat 
Marwick Mitchell) studies, conducted during the litigation, included 
branch office costs.  The President of MLAM  testified that the branch 
costs would still exist even if the fund did not, favoring the Fitzgerald 
cost estimates as the most accurate.43   
The following Table reproduces part of the District Court’s 
exhibit on profitability.  It examines the latest period of analysis and adds 
                                                          
41 Id. at 1050. 
42 Id. The Fitz-Gerald estimate was conducted in order to determine the 
level of reimbursement from the fund to brokerage operations. 
43 Id. at 1051. 
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a column for Profit Margin. 44   The Court concluded that, “[e]ven 
adopting the lowest estimate of processing costs (the reimbursement 
figure of the Fitzgerald estimate), the profitability of administering the 
Fund and the shareholder services amounted to four and a half ten 
thousandths (.00045) of the average net assets under supervision.”45 
 
Period 
June 1980 to 
June 1981 
Profit 
Margin 
Average Net Assets $13,520,000,000  
Fees $39,369,587  
Direct Expenses $1,567,847  96.0% 
Income Tax (55.774%) $21,083,543  
Net Earnings $16,718,197  
Order Volume 6,096,537  
Expenses Fitzgerald $10,534,805  69.3% 
Diemer $30,848,477  17.7% 
PMM $45,541,130  -19.7% 
Net Income Fitzgerald $6,183,392    
Diemer ($14,130,280) 
PMM ($28,822,934) 
 
By this calculation, the Court implied that profits as a percent of 
assets under management were trivial and thus could be not excessive.  
The Court invented a metric that was tiny and appeared reasonable.  The 
proper metric should consider profit as a percent of revenues.  Revenues 
are a small percentage of assets and thus, the Court’s examination of 
                                                          
44 Id. at 1053. In this table, the top line 96 percent number is best 
interpreted as a GPM. The Fitz-Gerald, Diemer and PMM numbers most 
closely resemble the Advisory Margin discussed above. The Advisory 
Margin numbers in the table ignore tax expenses included in the 
Gartenberg Court’s calculations and are thus consistent with subsequent 
case law. 
45 Id. at 1054. 
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profits as a percent of assets is misleading.  Even taking into account the 
incremental processing cost, the Advisory Margin was almost 70 percent.   
 
 E. Economies of Scale 
 
Here, an extended quote from the District Court is in order: 
 
Defendants have raised doubts as to whether there are 
further economies of . . . scale in the provision of the 
services.  While the unit costs of portfolio management 
and general administrative services have almost certainly 
declined as the Fund has grown, the far greater costs of 
providing shareholder services appear to have remained 
relatively stable. 
 
As the trustees were informed in 1980, this was 
MLAM's reason for refusing to introduce any additional 
breakpoints. MLAM does not propose to introduce 
additional breakpoints at asset levels over $2.5 billion 
because it believes the economies of scale applicable at 
lower asset levels tend to diminish when the fee rate 
reaches 0.275%... 
 
(T)his “diminishing return” occurs largely because the 
costs of MLAM and Merrill Lynch associated with 
processing orders and administering shareholder 
accounts have not diminished as assets increase beyond 
the $2.5 billion level. 46 
 
This is the genesis of Judge Pollack’s “economies of scale (do 
not) necessarily apply to every stage of growth” insertion into the 
opinion’s legislative intent section.  It is surely no coincidence that this is 
exactly the argument made by Merrill Lynch with respect to economies 
of scale.  Again, the truly important economic issues are obscured by a 
misguided emphasis on processing costs.  
The industry subterfuge  - claiming that economies of scale are 
exhausted, and therefore no further fee reductions are necessary - is 
                                                          
46 Id. at 1055. 
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exposed.47  Exclusive of processing costs, Merrill Lynch would get to 
keep $.96 of every revenue dollar going forward and the processing costs 
would not decrease further, allowing MLAM to claim that economies of 
scale are exhausted. If processing costs are included in allowed costs, 
then Merrill would get to keep about $.70 of revenues going forward.  
The Merrill Lynch fee schedule called for a fee of .275 percent 
on all revenues above $2.5 billion.  Since average assets in June of 1981 
were about $13.5 billion, Merrill got to keep .00275 times $11 billion 
times .96, or about $29 million of the incremental revenue above $2.5 
billion.  Allowing for processing costs, the number is approximately $21 
million.      
Ultimately, in the body of the Opinion, the District Court could 
reach no opinion about the existence of economies of scale but found 
that: “In any event, even if there do exist economies of scale, the present 
structure of  MLAM’s fee means that its effective fee has decreased as 
the size of the Fund has grown.” However, in the conclusions section, the 
Court stated: “MLAM has shared with the Fund those economies of scale 
that it has realized from the Fund’s growth in size.”  
 
 F. Conclusion 
 
Finally, the District Court’s conclusion emphasizes the 
comparison of MLAM fees to industry fees in general, and offers its 
view of competition in the money fund business: 
 
                                                          
47 Id. at 1064. The District Court in Gartenberg enthusiastically praised 
the deliberations of the Board of Trustees here, though the Board seems 
to have fallen for the same subterfuge as the Court. Apparently, MLAM 
misled the supposedly sophisticated Board of Trustees.  Essentially, what 
MLAM was saying was that profit margins had flattened and therefore 
no further breakpoints were called for.  However, a flat profit margin at a 
very high level meant the MLAM saw dollar profits grow exponentially 
with the exponential growth of assets. Fund sponsors get to spend dollar 
profits, not profit margins. This deliberate distortion of economic reality 
has led to great confusion in subsequent fee cases.  
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…when the fee is in harmony with the broad and 
prevailing market choice available to the 
investor…There would seem to be no sense to seek to 
limit by judicial fiat what is satisfactorily performed, 
sufficiently disclosed and freely available elsewhere in 
the market place at comparable charges, without penalty 
or restraint…Based on the rate of payment alone, that 
rate of compensation received by the adviser is neither 
extraordinary nor uncommon but is a commercially 
realistic rate. 
 
The money market fund industry is a highly competitive 
business. There is no monopoly. There is no limited 
entry. There has been ample disclosure by the Adviser of 
the rate of fees to prospective customers, shareholders, 
the Fund and its trustees.48  
 
The decision may have been pre-ordained, given the legislative 
desire to maintain the status quo and the successful clouding of the issue 
because of processing costs.  Unfortunately, the District Court appears to 
have bought, uncritically, the industry’s talking points. 
 
V. THE GARTENBERG SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION 
 
The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s opinion and 
established the “Gartenberg factors.”  Much of the decision reined in 
mistakes and excesses in the District Court opinion.  
 
 A. The Second Circuit Disagreed with the District Court’s 
 Reliance on Fees Charged by Similar Funds 
 
The Appellate Court differed from the District Court regarding 
comparable fees:  
 
We disagree with the district court's suggestions that the 
principal factor to be considered in evaluating a fee's 
fairness is the price charged by other similar advisers to 
funds managed by them, that the "price charged by 
                                                          
48 Id. at 1067. 
36
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 16 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol16/iss2/2
Spring] Analytical Clarity  365 
 
advisers to those funds establishes the free and open 
market level for fiduciary compensation," that the 
"market price ... serves as a standard to test the fairness 
of the  investment advisory fee," and that a fee is fair if it 
"is in harmony with the broad and prevailing market 
choice available to the investor," 528 F.Supp. at 1049, 
1067-68.   Competition between money market funds for 
shareholder business does not support an inference that 
competition must therefore also exist between adviser-
managers for fund business.   The former may be 
vigorous even though the latter is virtually non-existent. 
Each is governed by different forces. Reliance on 
prevailing industry advisory fees will not satisfy §36(b). 
49  
 
 B. The Second Circuit Cleaned Up the District Court’s 
 Profitability Analysis 
 
The Appellate Court calculated the Net Income Margin using the 
Fitzgerald estimate of processing costs and found that it was 38.4 
percent.50  Using a similar methodology but ignoring processing costs, 
the Net Income Margin using direct costs only is 53.3 percent.  The 
Second Circuit did not suggest a fiduciary maximum net income margin 
because the three cost estimates varied widely. 
 
 C. The Second Circuit Cast Doubt on the Competition Issue 
 
The District Court opined that the money fund market is highly 
competitive and therefore the fee charged could not be unfair.  The 
Appeals Court disagreed with this view and made the astute observation: 
 
                                                          
49 Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929 (2d Cir. 1982). 
50 The Second Circuit used a 44.5 percent corporate tax rate to calculate 
the net income margin. Id. at 932. 
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One reason why fund competition for shareholder 
business does not lead to competition between adviser-
managers for fund business is the relative insignificance 
of the adviser's fee to each shareholder. The fund 
customer's shares of the advisory fee is usually too small 
a factor to lead him to invest in one fund rather than in 
another or to monitor adviser-manager's fees. ‘Cost 
reductions in the form of lower advisory fees ... do not 
figure significantly in the battle for investor favor.’ Id. 
Hence money market funds do not generally advertise 
that their advisory fees may be lower than those charged 
by advisers to other funds. The disparity is competitively 
insignificant. In the present case, for instance, the 
alleged excessive Manager's fee amounts to $2.88 a year 
for each $1,000 invested. If rates charged by the many 
other advisers were an affirmative competitive criterion, 
there would be little purpose in §36(b). 
 
 D. The Gartenberg Factors 
 
In determining whether fees charged are so excessive they could 
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, the Second Circuit set forth six 
analytical factors: 
 
 1. The nature and quality of the services provided to the fund 
 2. The profitability of the fund to the adviser-manager 
 3. Fall out benefits 
 4. Economies of scale 
 5. Comparative fee structures 
 6. The independence and conscientiousness of the trustees 
 
These factors, now enshrined in mutual fund fee case law, were 
misapplied under the unique facts in Gartenberg. Two ( 1 & 3 above) are 
inapplicable to mutual funds in general, and two (2 & 4 above) were 
misleadingly applied because of processing costs.  
 
 E. Nature and Quality of the Services Provided 
The services provided in Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust 
involved the interaction of brokers with clients, an activity not normally 
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associated with the advisory contract. Advisory services typically 
involve portfolio construction and management and no interaction with 
fund investors.51 In normal mutual funds, these interactions are handled 
under the transfer agent or distribution contract and are charged 
separately from advisory fees. §36(b) cases should be limited to advisory 
fees only. But this factor confuses the issue, and subsequent courts have 
often felt compelled to examine shareholder services and expense ratios 
along with advisory services and fees, resulting in confusion.  
 
 F. Profitability of the Fund to the Adviser-Manager 
 
Neither Gartenberg opinion could establish a statutory 
maximum profit margin due to the wide variability of the different cost 
estimates associated with the anomalous processing costs. 
 
  G. Fall-Out Benefits 
 
The fall-out benefits in Gartenberg were the potential increase in 
brokerage commission income associated with the pairing of the money 
fund with a brokerage account, something unique to this type of fund, 
and irrelevant to the typical stand-alone equity/bond fund.  
 
  H. Economies of Scale 
 
Similar to profit margins, economies of scale were indeterminate 
and confounded by the unique processing costs in Gartenberg, which 
became a misleading precedent for measuring economies of scale. 
 
  I. Comparative Fee Structures 
 
The Second Circuit had reservations about the District Court’s 
consideration of other funds’ fees to justify the fees in Gartenberg. The 
                                                          
51 The advisory  function, by its nature, is readily quantifiable and 
comparable to similar funds. Numerical comparisons include returns and 
fees. Non-advisory services, by their nature, are more qualitative   and 
allow greater scope for subjective interpretation. 
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Appellate Court does reasonably assert that the “structure” (meaning the 
breakpoints) of other funds is relevant, given the Senate’s position. 
 
We do not suggest that rates charged by 
other adviser-managers to other similar 
funds are not a factor to be taken into 
account.  Indeed, to the extent that other 
managers have tended "to reduce their 
effective charges as the fund grows in 
size," the Senate Committee noted that 
such a reduction represents "the best 
industry practice [which] will provide a 
guide." 52   
 
 J. The Independence and Conscientiousness of the Trustees 
 
Mutual fund trustees serve as watchdogs for the interests of fund 
shareholders. Subsequent to Gartenberg, their main function is to insure 
that fund management is in regulatory compliance with the rules.  
 
 K. The Gartenberg Standard(s) 
 
The Second Circuit articulated not one, but two standards. 
However, the decision and subsequent courts have clearly favored the 
second standard. The first standard would seem to support the SEC 
position:  
 
Standard 1: “the legislative history of §36(b) 
indicates that the substitution of the term 
‘fiduciary duty’ for ‘reasonable,’ while possibly 
intended to modify the standard somewhat, was 
a more semantical than substantive 
compromise….As the district court and all 
parties seem to recognize, the test is essentially 
whether the fee schedule represents a charge 
within the range of what would have been 
                                                          
52 Id. at 929. 
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negotiated at arm's-length in the light of all of 
the surrounding circumstances.”53   
 
From an economic point of view, this “negotiated at arm’s-length” 
standard is appealing; the language is precise and the standard is 
amenable to statistical analysis with a reasonable degree of precision. 
The notion of a range of outcomes has clear mathematical meaning, and 
fees “negotiated at arm’s- length” can be observed empirically.  
Standard 1 asserts that the proper test for fee comparison is to 
compare fund fees to fees actually determined in arm’s-length 
negotiations. This is called the “institutional comparison” and it refers to 
the comparison of fund fees to comparable institutional fees negotiated at 
arm’s-length, which is the comparison examined in  the Wharton and PPI 
studies.   
The problem in Gartenberg is that the comparison was corrupted by 
processing costs which were unique to that fund:  
 
Appellants' argument that the lower fees charged 
by investment advisers to large pension funds 
should be used as a criterion for determining fair 
advisory fees for money market funds must also 
be rejected. The nature and extent of the services 
required by each type of fund differ sharply.  As 
the district court recognized, the pension fund 
does not face the myriad of daily purchases and 
redemptions throughout the nation which must 
be handled by the Fund, in which a purchaser 
may invest for only a few days.54  
This language is important. The myriad of daily purchases and 
redemptions throughout the nation clearly refers to the Merrill Lynch 
brokerage operations and the concomitant processing costs.  Merrill 
Lynch operated branch offices throughout the nation and the time 
brokers spent writing trade tickets was counted in Gartenberg as a 
                                                          
53 Id. at 928 (emphasis added). 
54 Id. at 930 n. 3 (emphasis added). 
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legitimate cost of operating the fund.55   
After presenting Standard 1, the Second Circuit briefly discusses 
the notion that “as a practical matter the usual arm’s-length bargaining 
between strangers does not occur between an adviser and the fund….” 
The Court then presented Standard 2: 
 
Standard 2: “To be guilty of a violation of §36(b), 
therefore, the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is 
so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable 
relationship to the services rendered and could not have 
been the product of arm's-length bargaining.”56  
 
The use of “therefore” suggests that the Court has, in some 
sense, refined and superseded its own Standard 1.  Moreover, “therefore” 
seems to be a non-sequitur. There is nothing that justifies the more 
subjective and extreme Standard 2, which is extreme in the sense that it 
is far more difficult for plaintiffs to overcome than Standard 1. It is more 
subjective and less amenable to quantification. 
Standard 2 involves a two-pronged test; the fee at issue must be 
“so disproportionately large” that it “could not have been the product of 
arm’s- length bargaining.” As Lyman Johnson 57  notes, “the court 
illogically framed the first prong in a way that deviates from 
‘reasonableness’ and seemed to require extremeness—‘so 
disproportionately large,’ not just ‘disproportionately large,’ and ‘no 
reasonable relationship,’ not just ‘unreasonable’.”  
Johnson goes on to discuss the corporate fiduciary doctrine and 
the relevance of the behavior of the fund’s trustees.  He then suggests 
that the Second Circuit's articulation of Standard 2 may have just been 
“clumsy”: 
                                                          
55 There is a subtle but important distinction to be made here. A money 
fund not integrated with brokerage operations would also face a myriad 
of daily purchases and withdrawals of customers throughout the nation. 
However, that money fund or indeed the typical equity fund would not 
bear the costs of such operations which are handled under a separate 
transfer agent contract. See, e.g., id. at 926. 
56 Id. at 928 (emphasis added). 
57 Lyman Johnson, A Fresh Look at Director “Independence”: Mutual 
Fund Fee Litigation and Gartenberg, 61 VAND. L. REV. 497, 516 (2008), 
https://perma.cc/DJ8N-CZS8. 
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Furthermore, given the court’s clear 
acknowledgement that a reasonableness 
standard is appropriate, its phrase ‘so 
disproportionately large that it bears no 
reasonable relationship to the services 
rendered’ is either a verbose way to 
express a reasonableness requirement or 
it wrongly introduces a stricter 
requirement that contradicts the very 
reasonableness standard that the court 
seemingly endorsed. The reading more 
consistent with legislative history and 
the rest of the opinion is that the court 
spoke clumsily.58   
 
A straightforward application of Occam’s Razor suggests that the Second 
Circuit’s articulation of the schizophrenic, subjective and extreme 
Standard 2 was a purposeful act consistent with the actual underlying 
legislative intent, which was to maintain the status quo of high fees in the 
mutual fund industry, and give deference to the advisors’ fee-related 
decisions.59 At any rate, Standard 2 is the de facto Gartenberg standard, 
which depends on the judgment of the fact-finder principally untethered 
from any real economic analysis.60 Essentially it says that unless the fee 
is so outrageously high that it is unconscionable, then it is acceptable, 
which looks like a “corporate waste” standard61 in everything but name. 
It is not so much a standard as it is permission for courts to do what they 
want, or more specifically, what Congress wanted. The important point is 
                                                          
58 Id. at 517-18. 
59 One hypothesis is that the dual standards illustrate an internal split in 
the Second Circuit.    
60 The explicit mention of “services rendered,” by implication, includes 
the corrupting and confounding shareholder service costs. 
61 The corporate waste standard is that the cost must “shock the 
conscience of the court.”  The test involves a determination of whether a 
stats agent’s actions fall outside the standards of civilized decency. The 
U.S. Supreme Court established the "shock-the-conscience test" 
in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
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that Standard 2 has prevailed over Standard 1 and the Gartenberg 
opinion articulated contradictory standards, hence, the resultant 
schizophrenia. The resulting Gartenberg Standard is an unduly high 
hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome. The Gartenberg analytical factors are 
confused and corrupted by the presence of anomalous processing costs, 
which give rise to the lack of “analytical clarity” noted by the US 
Supreme Court in Jones v. Harris62.   
 
VI. GARTENBERG’S  PROGENY: SCHUYT, KRINSK, AND KALISH  
None of the Gartenberg successor cases involved equity funds; 
rather, each involved funds that in one way or another were anomalous 
and unrepresentative of funds in general.  This reinforced the confusion 
generated by the processing costs considered in Gartenberg. The 
industry was astute in allowing these particular funds to come to trial. 
Schuyt established a precedent for very high profit margins; Kalish 
established the precedent of disallowing fee comparisons with the 
Vanguard family of mutual funds.   
A. Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, Inc.  
 
Schuyt was brought in 1980 and was pending while the 
Gartenberg court was deliberating.  Like Gartenberg, the fund in Schuyt 
was a money market fund but unlike Gartenberg, the fund was not 
integrated into a brokerage firm and thus had no processing costs to 
confuse the issue. The costs of interactions with investors in Schuyt were 
handled by the fund’s transfer agent. The transfer agent contract was 
separate from the advisory contract. 
Although there were no processing costs per se, the advisory 
contract was not exclusively for advisory services. It included 
compensation for administrative services, thus confusing the issues 
significantly. The administrative services provided fell into four 
categories: shareholder services, fund accounting, meeting legal and 
regulatory requirements, and marketing. The first and last of these are 
typically characterized as distribution costs.  
Judge Ward, in Schuyt, made one peculiar ruling and one 
obvious error. Curiously, he chose to ignore expert economic testimony 
because the economic experts did not offer legal analysis of the behavior 
of the Trustees. The testimony of plaintiff’s expert Professor Bicksler, 
                                                          
62 Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 353 (2010). 
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was “not given much weight” because, among other things, he failed to 
investigate “whether the independent directors in this case bargained 
with care and in good faith." 63  Plaintiff’s expert Silver, as with the 
Wharton and PPI studies, compared the profit margins on the money 
fund to the profit margins of private counsel (institutional) clients and 
concluded that the money fund profitability percentage (exclusive of 
marketing) was significantly higher than that of other product lines of the 
adviser. Judge Ward discounted Mr. Silver’s testimony for ignoring the 
Gartenberg factors, and not studying “the actual behavior of the directors 
in negotiating the fee.”   It seems peculiar that an expert conducting an 
economic analysis that essentially followed the Wharton and PPI studies 
should not be given much weight. 
Judge Ward significantly erred when he ruled that Mr. Silver’s 
analysis was flawed for comparing fee rates and profitability to rates and 
profitability of “companies that perform services that are unrelated to the 
advisory services at issue in this case.” Specifically, “fee rates of 
advisers to non-mutual fund clients should not be used as criterion for 
determining fairness of mutual fund fees because advisers to other types 
of entities perform services that do not involve a myriad of daily 
purchases and redemptions." 64 
The error is that the “myriad of daily purchases and 
withdrawals” was relevant in Gartenberg because of the processing costs 
of brokers writing trade tickets in Merrill Lynch’s  branch office 
structure. In Schuyt, the money fund had a transfer agent to handle 
purchases and withdrawals; the portfolio manager would receive one 
number each day representing the net of purchase and withdrawal 
transactions. In money fund management it is normal to deal with such 
cash flows. There are no significant cost differences in managing an 
institutional and a mutual fund portfolio where cash flows are concerned. 
Judge Ward rejected all expert testimony establishing any 
connection between the fee charges on the Rowe Price Prime Reserve 
Fund and fees set by actual arm’s-length negotiation. He determined that 
the actual fee on the Prime Reserve Fund was in the range of fees 
determined by arm’s- length negotiation by deferring to the good faith 
deliberations of the Board of Directors of the Prime Reserve Fund in 
                                                          
63 Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, Inc., 663 F. Supp 962, 973 
n.37 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
64 Id. at 973 n.38 (emphasis added). 
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spite of the fact that the Board did not consider the profitability of 
fees/funds actually established by arm’s- length negotiation. The Court 
ruled:  
 
Having found the testimony of the 
experts presented by both sides to be 
unavailing, in that all of the experts 
failed to address the relevant legal as 
opposed to economic implications of 
this case, the Court itself now must 
apply the analysis required in this 
Circuit. Although the Court considered 
all relevant facts in connection with the 
determination and receipt of the fees, the 
Court accorded the greatest weight to 
the testimony and documentary 
evidence which shed light on factors 
stressed by the Second Circuit: the 
nature and quality of the services 
rendered, the cost of these services, the 
sharing of economies of scale as the 
Fund increased in size, and the 
qualifications and performance of the 
independent directors65. 
 
i. The Profit Margin Standard 
 
Judge Ward accepted the profit margin calculation of plaintiff’s 
expert Silver: 59.1% in 1979, 66.8% in 1980 and 77.3% in 1981: 
 
While it cannot be denied that the 
Adviser earned a significant profit from 
these services, it does not appear to the 
Court, in light of all of the facts, that the 
fees charged by the Adviser were so 
disproportionately large that they bore 
no reasonable relationship to the 
services rendered and could not have 
                                                          
65 Id. at 974. 
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been the product of arms-length 
bargaining66.  
 
 In the immediately following footnote 77 of the opinion, 
the Court observed:   
 
 The Court wishes to make clear that it is 
not holding that a profit margin of up to 
77.3% can never be excessive.  In fact, 
under other circumstances, such a profit 
margin could very well be excessive.  
For example, if advisory services being 
challenged were not of the highest 
quality and if the directors were not so 
obviously qualified, fully informed, and 
conscientious, a similar fee structure 
could violate section §36(b). This Court 
is simply holding that on the facts 
presented here, the fee schedules at issue 
represent charges within the range of 
what would have been negotiated at 
arms-length in the light of all of the 
surrounding circumstances.  
 
The subjectivity of Gartenberg is in full view, and Judge Ward 
does not appear to be totally confident in his arguments; his opinion is 
hedged, defensive and apologetic. At any rate, 77% has been the 
fiduciary standard maximum profit margin for more than 25 years and 
the implication, consistent with Judge Ward’s tone, is that this number is 
high.   
 
 ii. Economies of Scale in Schuyt 
 
Schuyt looked at fees and fee breakpoints superficially and noted 
that the Board reduced them as assets increased. There was no analysis 
of costs or scale factors, or any attempt to quantify economies of scale: 
the presence of breakpoints was seemingly sufficient to convince the 
                                                          
66 Id. at 989. 
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Court that economies of scale had been adequately addressed. Even with 
breakpoints, the Advisory Margin on the prime reserve fund was 77%, 
which the Court found acceptable. 67 
 
B. Krinsk v. Fund Asset Management, Inc.68  
 
Krinsk followed Gartenberg in a suit against the Merrill Lynch 
money fund imbedded in the Cash Management Account (CMA).  In the 
interim period, Merrill Lynch brokers were no longer writing trade 
tickets on money fund transactions. However, fund trustees had approved 
a distribution plan to encourage brokers to promote the fund. The 
distribution fee of 12.5 basis points was added to the advisory fee; 
brokers received 11 of the 12.5 basis points.   
District Judge Walker ruled that the relevant fee was the 
advisory fee plus the distribution fee. Similar to Gartenberg, the 
inclusion of non-advisory activities on the firm’s part corrupted the 
analysis of advisory fees and prevented a clear determination of 
profitability and economies of scale. Merrill Lynch argued that the 
distribution fee was inadequate to cover the time brokers spent dealing 
with money fund issues, and that overall, these activities generated losses 
to the firm.   
Faced with a range of pre-tax profit margin numbers from the 
negative to about 40%, Judge Walker determined that a true figure for a 
three year weighted average margin would “probably fall in the range of 
a few percentage points greater that 0% to perhaps as much as 33%." 69   
The Court’s findings on economies of scale were confuseing and 
contradictory. Judge Walker found that “merely because the ratio of fee 
based expenses to fee based revenue declined at a time when the Fund 
size grew, that fact does not establish that such a decline was necessarily 
due to economies of scale.” 70  On the contrary, declining fee-based 
expenses relative to fee-based revenues, resulting from an increase in 
assets, is a clear indication of economies of scale in the advisory 
function. Judge Walker reached this conclusion because, “Although the 
                                                          
67 As discussed above, an Advisory Margin of 77 percent is associated 
with a scale factor maximum of .23, an indication of substantial realized 
economies of scale.  
68 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir 1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 919 (1989). 
69 Id. at 496. 
70 Id. at 496. 
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per-unit cost of providing management services directly to the fund 
decreases as the fund grows, the per- unit cost of servicing fund 
shareholders does not.” 71 Because non-advisory activities were lumped 
in with the advisory function, the failure to demonstrate economies of 
scale in each activity was considered evidence of an overall lack of 
economies of scale. Ultimately, the decision favored Merrill Lynch and 
the close integration of the fund with brokerage activities once again 
corrupted the analysis. Like Gartenberg, the fund in Krinsk was 
relatively unique and a poor candidate for a precedent-setting case.72 
  
 C. Kalish v. Franklin Advisers, Inc.73  
 
Kalish is another case decided subsequent to Gartenberg. The 
fund at issue was a GNMA74 fund.  A distinguishing feature of the fund 
is that it paid for advisory and administrative services under a single 
unified contract. The contract included services for “underwriting, 
transfer agent, management and other” services. The fund had an 
expense ratio of .545% and an advisory fee over the period in question of 
.45%. 
                                                          
71 Id. 
72 See id. at 497. See generally, Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset 
Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1982). The money fund in Krinsk was 
not totally unique; the case notes that in the winter of 1986, Lipper 
American Security Corporation reported 138 retail taxable money market 
funds of which 9 were central asset account funds, meaning 9 were 
integrated with the brokerage function. It is interesting that the Krinsk 
court acknowledged differences between stand-alone funds and funds 
that are part of central asset accounts stating: “Because stand-alone funds 
differ from central asset account funds in their services to shareholders 
and in their role as a vehicle for holding a customer’s assets, the prices 
charged for them are not entirely comparable.” Krinsk, 715 F. Supp. at 
497. The Krinsk court thus ratified the central thesis of this paper that the 
fund in Gartenberg, the precedent setting case differed from mutual 
funds in general, the vast majority of which were stand-alone funds. 
73 742 F.Supp. 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
74 GNMA is an acronym for the Government National Mortgage 
Association and GNMA bonds are bundled packages of mortgages that 
are marketable securities. Id. at 1223-24. 
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The Court in Kalish analyzed the unified fee and made no 
attempt to analyze advisory services separate from administrative 
services. As a result, similar to the previous three cases, the analysis of 
profitability and economies of scale were corrupted and indeterminate.75  
Plaintiffs in Kalish argued that the Franklin GNMA fund fees were 
excessive relative to a comparable Vanguard GNMA fund. Defendants 
contended that the structure of the Vanguard family of funds is unique 
because the Vanguard family of funds owns the management company, 
and thus renders services to the funds at cost, whereas in the Franklin 
family, Franklin Advisers seeks to make a profit. 
The contention was only partially correct. Administrative 
services were indeed provided to the Vanguard GNMA fund at cost. 
However, advisory services were provided by a sub-advisory contract 
with Wellington Management, a for-profit company. The expense ratio 
of the Vanguard fund was 35 basis points and the sub-advisory fee was 
3 basis points. It bears repeating that Wellington Management was a 
for-profit company and was thus able to manage the portfolio for three3 
basis points and still make a profit.  
So, Vanguard was providing all administrative services for 32 
basis points (the 35 basis point expense ratio less the 3 basis point sub-
advisory fee). The Franklin Expense ratio was 54.5 basis points 
including all administrative and advisory fees. This means that if the 
Franklin advisory fee was the same as the Vanguard sub-advisory fee, 
or 3 basis points, Franklin shareholders were paying 51.5 basis points 
for all non-advisory services, a 61 percent premium in excess of 
Vanguard. It is not clear how much more expensive it is to provide 
administrative services in a for-profit company than it is to provide 
them at cost, but common sense suggests that it is not 61 percent more 
expensive. If the Franklin advisory fee was double the Vanguard 
advisory fee, or 6 basis points, then the Franklin administrative 
premium would still be in excess of 50 percent. If Franklin charged 
three times as much for advisory services, or 9 basis points, then its 
administrative services would still be 42 percent higher than 
                                                          
75 The Court in Kalish had to deal with the issue of whether underwriting 
expenses were properly charged as an expense in calculating 
profitability. In the process, management fees and management expenses 
for the firm and the fund were identified for three periods.  Gross profit 
margins for Franklin as a whole were in the neighborhood of 92 percent. 
The GPM for the GNMA fund in question was in excess of 99 percent. 
Id. at 1228. 
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Vanguard’s administrative services. It is not clear how much higher the 
Franklin fee would have to be relative to the Vanguard advisory fee in 
order for it to be so disproportionately large as to constitute a breach of 
fiduciary duty, but because the advisory fee was hidden or buried 
within the unified fee, the Court never made that determination.  
Ultimately, the judge concluded that the Vanguard comparison 
was not persuasive: 
 
The conclusion to be drawn is that the Vanguard 
GNMA fund furnishes some basis for a comparison 
of performance with the Franklin Fund, but there 
are also significant differences in structure, peculiar 
to the Vanguard family of funds, which lessen the 
value of the comparison for purposes of this 
litigation.76  
 
Vanguard advisory fees are a good proxy for institutional fees 
because they are competitively negotiated at arm’s-length. The 
institutional comparison was disallowed in the Gartenberg, Schuyt and 
Krinsk cases, and the Kalish precedent effectively disallowed it for 
Vanguard.77   
 
 D. Conclusion 
 
Taken together, Gartenberg ,Schuyt, Krinsk and Kalish are the 
precedents that have defined the fee litigation landscape for more than 
twenty-five years. As such, they have successfully fulfilled the 
Congressional intent of maintaining the status quo of mutual fund fees. 
Although three of the four funds were money market funds, and the 
                                                          
76 Id. at 1231. 
77 Kalish also corroborates the notion that the fall-out benefit factor is an 
artifact of the unique nature of the fund in Gartenberg. Brokerage 
commission income accruing to Merrill Lynch was a factor in the case. 
“Another factor mentioned by the Second Circuit in Krinsk, ‘fall-out 
benefits,’ is not implicated by the facts of the case at bar.”  Id. at 1228 
n.1. 
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fourth (Kalish) was also a fixed income fund, the precedent(s) applies to 
all kinds of mutual funds, equity, fixed income, international, life cycle, 
etc. The misguided notion that there are significantly higher costs 
associated with managing mutual fund portfolios because of the large 
customer base persists to this day.   
 
VII. THE FREEMAN AND BROWN STUDY  
 
FB updated the Wharton and PPI studies. They contacted the 100 
largest public pension plans and asked for fee information on equity 
portfolios managed by external investment advisory firms. Information 
was presented on a total of 220 individual actively managed pension 
portfolios totaling about $100 billion in assets. The assets and fees on the 
pension portfolios were compared to the assets and fees of similar mutual 
funds and the results confirmed and amplified the Wharton and PPI 
observation that mutual funds pay higher investment management fees 
than institutional investors. Like the Wharton and PPI studies, FB 
concluded that the differential is the result of a lack of arm’s length 
negotiation of mutual fund advisory fees.  
 
 A. Overview of Freeman Brown Results  
Pension and Mutual Fund Portfolios were ranked by assets under 
management and arranged in deciles.78 Weighted average fees were then 
computed within each asset decile. Pension and Mutual Fund fees were 
then compared. Table 2 presents the results in tabular form and Exhibit 3 
in graphical form. Mutual fund fees were the advisory fees exclusive of 
administrative and distribution fees. Overall, weighted average pension 
fees were 28 basis points while mutual fund fees were 56 basis points. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
78 Each decile contained 10 percent of the total number of funds 
examined.  
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Table 2 
Comparison of Public Pension and Mutual Fund Investment 
Advisory Fees 
 Public Pension Funds Mutual Funds 
Decile Average 
Portfolio Size 
$mm 
Weighted 
Average 
Advisory Fee 
(Basis Pts) 
Average  
Fund Size     
$mm 
Weighted 
Average   
Adv. Fee 
(Basis Pts) 
1 36 60 24 77 
2 79 57 47 77 
3 130 49 76 75 
4 194 42 121 74 
5 257 37 185 73 
6 327 42 284 71 
7 437 33 454 73 
8 579 28 759 69 
9 842 22 1,527 66 
10 1,550 20 9,666 50 
Overall 443 28 1,318 56 
 
In Exhibit 3, the height of the bars represents fees in basis points. 
The ten bars represent asset deciles with the smallest funds on the left 
and the largest on the right. Note that for both pension and mutual fund 
portfolios, fees tend to fall as portfolio size increases although this effect 
is much more pronounced for pension than mutual fund portfolios. The 
decrease is the result of economies of scale being passed along to 
53
Brown: Mutual Fund Advisory Fee Litigation: Some Analytical Clarity
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2016
382 Journal of Business & Securities Law [Vol. 16 
portfolio owners. The more pronounced decrease for pension fees is 
consistent with economies of scale and greater competitive pressures on 
pension managers. The fact that mutual fund fees do not decrease much 
is consistent with a lack of competitive pressures allowing mutual fund 
sponsors to capture the profits associated with economies of scale.79  
 
Exhibit 3 
 
 
 
                                                          
79 The difference between average pension fees and average mutual fund 
fees is understated. The average pension portfolio held $443 million in 
assets while the average mutual fund portfolio held about $1.3 billion. If 
the largest mutual funds are excluded to calibrate similar sized portfolios, 
the weighted average mutual fund advisory fee is 68 basis points 
compared to a similar sized pension portfolio fee of 26 basis points. The 
difference is 42 basis points. Viewed another way, asset managers 
charged about $1.15 million (26 bp on $443 million) to manage a 
pension portfolio and about $7.4 million (56 bp on $1.3 billion) for 
similar services to mutual funds.  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Pension Fees Mutual Fund Fees
54
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 16 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol16/iss2/2
Spring] Analytical Clarity  383 
 
A notable feature of Table 2 is the pronounced negative skew in 
the distribution of fund assets80. This is true for both pension and mutual 
fund portfolios but it much more pronounced for mutual funds than for 
pension portfolios. Pension assets almost double from the ninth to the 
tenth pension ($1,550 from $842 million) while mutual fund assets 
increase more than six fold ($9,666 from $1,527 million). 
Pension fees decline quite smoothly over the range of assets, 
consistent with pension investment managers passing along economies of 
scale as they occur. By contrast, mutual fund advisory fees only drift 
downward slowly until the top decile when fees plummet from 66 to 50 
basis points. This is consistent with the larger funds instituting 
breakpoints at higher assets levels, perhaps to keep profits below the 77 
percent Schuyt81 ceiling. 
 
B. The Industry Response to Freeman and Brown 
 
The industry response to FB took two forms, both related to the 
Law of One Price. ICI Economist Collins argued that the services 
provided to mutual funds were substantially different and more 
expensive than the services provided to pension funds.82 His arguments 
are a continuation of the distortions produced by the processing costs in 
Gartenberg. The Investment Company Institute also sponsored 83 
research by Coates and Hubbard84, which argued that advisory fees are 
constrained by competitive forces.    
 
 
 
                                                          
80 There are a large number of small funds and a small number of very 
large funds. 
81 See Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, 663 F. Supp. 962, 989 
n.77 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
82 Sean Collins, The Expenses of Defined Benefit Pension Plans and 
Mutual Funds, 9 INV. CO. INST. PERSPECTIVE No. 6 (Dec. 2003), 
available at https://perma.cc/V574-7M5K. 
83 The Coates & Hubbard study was at least partially sponsored by a 
subsidiary of the ICI. See Asher Hawkins, Well-Funded Opinion, 
FORBES (May 8, 2009), https://perma.cc/R49K-EPRC [hereinafter CH]. 
84 Id. 
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 C.   Collins: The ICI Perspective 
 
The Collins article is based largely in misdirection. He compares 
operating expense ratios on pension and mutual fund portfolios and finds 
them to be far different. Operating expense ratios are defined as advisory 
fees plus administrative fees and are naturally quite different because 
mutual funds must deal with far more customers. Collins does identify 
the differences in advisory costs and FB as well as Freeman, Brown and 
Pomerantz85 cost out these differences in the neighborhood of three basis 
points, not enough to account for the 26 basis point difference in mutual 
and pension advisory fees.  
 
D. Coates and Hubbard 
 
Coates and Hubbard ("CH") postulate that conditions in the 
mutual fund “markets” approximate the theoretical model of perfect 
competition, i.e., a large number of rational and well-informed buyers 
and sellers dealing in a homogeneous product with no barriers to entry or 
exit. With perfect competition, market prices are in some sense correct 
and thus cannot be excessive.   
One major problem with the CH argument is the evidence that 
many mutual fund investors are unsophisticated and make poor 
investment decisions.86 CH handle these apparent problems in the core 
proposition of the paper: 
                                                          
85 John Freeman et al., Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New Evidence and a 
Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 83, 110 n.92 (2008). 
 
86 There is evidence that many investors do not understand the concept of 
an expense ratio. See Gordon Alexander et al., Mutual Fund 
Shareholders: Characteristics, Investor Knowledge, & Sources of 
Information, 7 FIN. SERVICES REV. 301, 302 (1998). The reported results 
of an SEC survey found that only nineteen percent of investors could 
give an estimate of expenses for their larges mutual fund. Id. at 302-05. 
A minority of respondents (forty-three percent) claimed to have known 
of the expenses of their largest funds at purchase and only sixteen 
percent of survey respondents believed that higher expenses led to lower-
than average returns. Id. Moreover, another study found that eighty-four 
percent of investors believe higher operating expenses mean better 
performance, despite clear evidence to the contrary. See Brad M. Barber, 
56
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 16 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol16/iss2/2
Spring] Analytical Clarity  385 
 
 
Given a sufficient number of buyers engaging in a price 
search for a given quality of product and service, willing 
and able to switch to competitors, fund advisers must 
price competitively for their funds to retain price-
sensitive customers. Competitive prices benefit all funds 
investors, price-searching and non-price-searching, tax-
constrained, or tax-free, alike. 87 
 
CH find that larger mutual funds have lower expense ratios and 
hypothesize that lower fees (competition) are the cause of higher asset 
levels. A more persuasive hypothesis is that as funds grow in size, they 
realize economies of scale and increased profit margins. The larger funds 
may decrease fees in order to keep margins under the 77 percent ceiling 
mandated by case law.    
Another problem with the CH proposition is that with profit 
margins perhaps as high as 77 percent, investment advisers are not 
incentivized to lower fees for all of their customers in order to retain 
price sensitive customers. Consider an abstract but reasonably realistic 
hypothetical: an actively managed large cap fund has $10 billion in 
assets and a 50 basis point advisory fee. The fund sponsor’s Advisory 
Margin is 70 percent, the typical large cap Advisory Margin according to 
MFGC A. The fund generates $50 million in revenues (.005 times $10 
billion) and operating profits of $35 million (.70 times $50 million). 
Assume that the fund sponsor is confronted with competition 
from Vanguard which offers an actively managed large cap fund with a 
25 basis point advisory fee. A single large investor with $1 billion 
invested in the fund will move to Vanguard unless the fee is lowered to 
match the 25 basis point Vanguard fee. 
The fund sponsor can keep the whole $10 billion in assets but 
must lower fees across the board so that revenues fall to $25 million and 
                                                                                                                                  
Terrance Odean, & Lu Zheng, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Effects of 
Expenses on Mutual Fund Flows, 78 JOURNAL OF BUS. 2095, 2099 
(2005). Approximately thirty percent of all US employees who are 
eligible to participate in a 401(K) plan do not enroll.  See RICHARD H. 
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT  
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 107 (Yale University Press, 2008). 
87 Id. at 136. 
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profits fall to $10 million.88 Or, the fund sponsor can let the $1 billion 
run off and maintain revenues of 50 basis points on $9 billion, or $45 
million. This would allow the sponsor to earn operating profits of about 
70 percent of $45 million or $30 million.89 So his/her choice is to earn 
$10 million and retain the fee sensitive assets, or $30 million, and let the 
fee sensitive assets leave. This choice is clear.   
The above example is stylized but realistic enough to illustrate 
the main point which is that when faced with the prospect of having 
assets leave the fund, or lowering the fees for all assets in the funds, 
investment advisors with profit margins as high as those documented 
here will rationally choose to maintain high levels of fees and profits and 
to let the assets exit the fund. It is unclear what percentage of total fund 
assets are fee-sensitive, but it seems obvious that it would have to be 
quite high in order for fund sponsors with 50 to 70 percent profit margins 
to lower fees for all fund participants, in order to retain the fee sensitive 
assets.  
CH only “suggest” that mutual fund markets are competitive. 
They say that fund markets are “consistent with competition,” and the 
“mutual fund industry’s market structure is consistent with competition 
providing strong constraints on advisory fees.” The structure “implies 
effective price competition.” 90 
The reason CH only suggest that mutual fund “markets” are 
competitive is that mutual fund expense ratios are not market prices; they 
are administered prices, the result of an annual approval process between 
the adviser and the mutual fund board. Investors, the ultimate buyers and 
the ultimate sellers (investment managers) do not directly interact to 
impact fees. Because buyers and sellers do not directly interact, expense 
ratios are not market prices. Finally, the fact that mutual funds are 
captive of fund sponsors is “consistent” with monopoly pricing. What is 
needed is some independent means of gauging the truth of the two 
                                                          
88 A 70% profit margin at 50 basis points on $10 billion means that costs 
would be 30 percent of $50 million or $15 million. If it is assumed that 
all of these costs are fixed, then the dollar profit would be revenue of $25 
million less costs of $15 million or $10 million.  
89 Using the same logic, if all costs are fixed, then the $45 million in 
revenue, less $15 million in costs, yields $30 million in profit.  In all 
likelihood, costs are not precisely constant but the main point of the 
illustration is clear.  
90 See Coates  supra note 11 at 163, 170, 174, 180, 184, 197, 200. 
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competing propositions. Brown 91  shows that the universe of publicly 
traded fund sponsors is extraordinarily profitable and that fund sponsors 
earn economic profits for their owners. Economic profits are a 
characteristic of firms with monopoly pricing power. 
 
VIII. RECENT CASES: IN RE AMERICAN MUTUAL FUNDS FEE 
 LITIGATION AND JONES V. HARRIS ASSOCIATES L.P. 
 
The American Mutual Funds Fee Litigation decision was 
published in December, 2009, subsequent to the appellate court split in 
Jones v. Harris but prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decision. 
 A. In Re: American Mutual Funds Fee Litigation 
The American Funds complex was/is the second largest by total 
assets in the U.S., behind Vanguard. The complex grew from $338 
billion at the end of 2002 to $2.1 Trillion92 and the end of 2009. There 
were only 30 funds93 in the complex but in 2009, four94 of the ten largest 
funds in the Morningstar database were American Funds offerings. The 
named funds each had 14 fund classes but only three were available to 
the general public, the A,B and C fund classes which each carried some 
form of a sales load. American Funds pursued brokerage firms 
aggressively in order to gain shelf space and the strategy was successful. 
With the application of breakpoints in the advisory contract, the 
Investment Advisor, Capital Research and Management Company 
(CRMC), aggressively reduced advisory fees as the funds grew in size. 
In addition to aggressive breakpoints on the investment advisory 
contract, CRMC also instituted fee waivers and instituted a profit sharing 
program for its employees which amounted to 35 percent of pre-tax 
operating income. The court characterized the level of profit sharing as 
                                                          
91  STEWART L. BROWN, Gartenberg: Some Empirical Clarity (June 9, 
2015), available at https://perma.cc/4RKQ-BJ3W. 
92 Principia Pro, MORNINGSTAR (December 2009). 
93 In re American Mut. Funds Fee Litigation, 2009 WL 5215755 at *5 
(C.D. Cal. 2009). 
94 These four were American Funds Fundamental Investors, Washington 
Mutual, Investment Company of America and Growth Fund of America. 
The latter had $156 billion in assets at the end of 2009. 
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“enormous and . . . at least some employees are compensated at levels 
that might be viewed as excessive." 95  Aggressive breakpoints, fee 
waivers and an “enormous” profit sharing pool are consistent with 
CRMC realizing economies of scale on very large funds and reducing 
profitability at the individual fund level in order to not exceed the Schuyt 
77 percent profit margin ceiling. 
Fortunately for CRMC, the issue of profit margins and 
economies of scale at the individual fund level never came up in the case. 
Plaintiffs charged 96 that overall fees on the eight largest funds in the 
complex were excessive, including advisory, distribution, and transfer 
agent fees. As in previous cases, advisory fees were never examined in 
isolation. The plaintiff’s theory was that excessive distribution fees 
caused assets to grow to the advantage of the defendants but the 
detriment of fund owners who, because of the size of the funds, suffered 
low returns. They also alleged that the largest funds were essentially 
closet index funds and that the investment advisor failed to share 
economies of scale and the fall out benefits arising from a subsidiary 
providing transfer agency services. On balance the plaintiff’s theory of 
the case was confused, convoluted, and overly broad. Thus, once again 
the industry was astute in allowing this case to come to trial as there was 
no possibility of a clean measure of economies of scale or clean 
comparison to fees actually determined at arm’s length.  
The court followed the Gartenberg precedent and found for the 
defendants, although apparently with some reluctance. The court found 
that the profit level of the various entities fell within the range of profit 
margins other courts have deemed acceptable under §36(b) 97 . Profit 
margins were examined at the advisory firm level and not at the 
individual fund level. Even so, as discussed below there is reason to 
believe that, measured properly the margins of the investment advisor 
were very high. 
Similar to margins, both sides agreed to examine economies of 
scale at the complex level. This led to unmitigated confusion of the 
issues as exemplified by the following: 
 
                                                          
95 Id. at *34. 
96 Second Amended Complaint, In re American Funds Fee Litig., No. 
CV-04-5593 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2006), available at 
https://perma.cc/F8GG-F8QT. 
97 In re American Mut. Funds Fee Litigation, supra note 93, at *47. 
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Economies of scale exist when “the per unit cost of 
performing Fund transactions decrease[s] as the number 
of transactions increase[s].” Krinsk, 875 F.2d at 411; see 
also Kalish, 742 F. Supp. at 1237 (“The concept of 
‘economies of scale’ assumes that as a mutual fund 
increases in size, its operational costs decrease 
proportionally”). “The concept [of economies of scale] is 
meaningful only if increased size of a fund (more 
shareholders, more assets under management) directly 
reduces the manager’s costs of processing each 
transaction and servicing each shareholder.” Kalish, 742 
F. Supp. at 1239.98 
 
Note the confusion caused by the anomalous processing costs in 
Gartenberg as it impacted on the notions of economies of scale in Krinsk 
and Kalish. The costs of processing transactions and servicing 
shareholders is irrelevant to economies of scale of the advisory function 
but in this case, as in other cases the advisory function is conflated with 
transfer agency and shareholder servicing which are provided under 
separate contracts.  
The court chastised the investment manager for making 
conflicting argument in regards to economies of scale: “CRMC has 
consistently argued that economies of scale cannot be achieved or 
measured, but it has also argued that it has conferred the benefits of 
economies of scale on it clients. CRMC cannot have it both ways99.” 
The court found that advisory fees and expense ratios were 
lower 100  than comparable Lipper averages for peer funds and that 
performance101 was above average. However, the court was quite critical 
of the unaffiliated directors. It found them to be highly qualified but that  
 
Although the record contains sufficient evidence to 
establish that the directors met their obligation under the 
Gartenberg standard, the record indicates that the 
Unaffiliated Directors’ did not diligently inquire into 
                                                          
98 Id. at *51. 
99 Id. at *56 n.6. 
100 Id. at *25.  
101 Id. at *21-22. 
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some issues of importance and failed to recognize the 
consequences of some of the information presented to 
them.102 
 
Ultimately, the court noted that the Gartenberg Standard was a 
very high hurdle for plaintiffs to meet and that in the present case it had 
not been met. Overall, the decision was viewed as a win by the industry, 
albeit with some trepidation. Mr. Daniel Pollack, a noted defense 
attorney,103 commented in “Is American Funds Case the Calm Before the 
Storm?":104 
 
The rumble of distant thunder can be heard in the 
American Funds fee case…. Although Judge Feess 
ultimately held . . . that the plaintiffs had not met their 
burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty under the 
Gartenberg standard, he was clearly not pleased with 
defendants. [A]lthough the directors were represented by 
counsel and were provided with detailed materials to 
which they and Defendants can point to and say "see 
how thorough and careful we were" the entire process 
seems less a true negotiation and more an elaborate 
exercise in checking off boxes and preparing the file.  
 
Reading these quite scathing lines, one might expect that 
defendants lost the case. However, that was not the case. 
The court ruled that the Gartenberg standard establishes 
a very high hurdle to overcome, and the plaintiffs failed 
in that effort. The American Funds case . . . is 
noteworthy [in] . . . that it expresses unhappiness with 
the state of the existing legal precedent, as did earlier 
courts. Another example of this unease is the 2000 
decision in Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming, where 
                                                          
102 Id. at *55. 
103 See Daniel A. Pollack—Biography, MCCARTER & ENGLISH 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, https://perma.cc/6ZGH-PT9C. It is interesting that 
Mr. Pollack is the son of District Court Judge Milton Pollack in the 
Gartenberg case. See id. Mr. Pollack was also the lead defense attorney 
in several mutual fund cases, including Burks, Schuyt and Kalish. Id. 
104 Daniel Pollack, Is American Funds Case the Calm Before the Storm?, 
https://perma.cc/6JBG-DQHJ. 
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District Judge Andre Davis (now a Fourth Circuit judge) 
wrote, "Investors in 'captive' mutual funds may well 
deserve, as some clearly desire, greater protection than 
the current legal regime against generous advisory and 
managerial fees. It may be that further legislative or 
regulatory study and action are overdue."  
 
Even though the case was distorted by the inclusion of 
distribution and processing costs in the analysis, there are indications that 
the investment management company was generating very high levels of 
profitability and economies of scale. The case includes pre-tax operating 
margins for the management company alone for the period 2003 to 2008. 
The average pre-tax margin was 45.5 percent 105 . The corresponding 
average pre-tax margin for the firms in the Mutual Fund Governance 
sample 106  was only 30 percent. Thus, as calculated CRMC pre-tax 
margins were 50 percent higher than a sample of publicly traded 
investment management companies. If it is assumed that expenses for the 
profit sharing plan characterized as “enormous” by the court are 
excluded, the firm’s pre-tax margin is 60 percent, more than double the 
average for publicly traded investment management companies. 
  Similarly, there are indications of substantial economies of scale 
in the advisory function. The costs of investment professionals are a 
major component of advisory costs. The number of investment 
professionals grew from 137 in 2003 to 167 in 2006107, a 22 percent 
increase. Over the corresponding period (2003-2006) total assets of the 
American Funds complex grew from $422 billion to $959 billion108, an 
increase of 127 percent. Thus, a casual examination of costs uncorrupted 
by distribution and processing costs indicates that advisory function was 
subject to substantial economies of scale.109 
Finally, it is instructive to examine the break point structure of 
                                                          
105 In re American Mut. Funds Fee Litigation, supra note 93, at *24. 
106 See supra note 23. 
107 In re American Mut. Funds Fee Litigation, supra note 93, at *16. 
108 Id. at *6. 
109 The Growth Fund of America was the second largest fund in the 
Morningstar universe in December of 2014, second only to the Pimco 
Total Return bond fund with about $202 billion in assets. Principia Pro, 
MORNINGSTAR (December 2009). 
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the Growth Fund of America (GFA), the largest American Funds mutual 
fund at the end of 2009. At that time, GFA had assets under management 
of $153 billion and its advisory fee was 28 basis points 110 . The 
breakpoint schedule started at 50 basis points for the first $1 billion 
under management and ended at 23.3 basis points for all assets over $230 
billion.111 There were a total of 21 different advisory fee steps in the 
whole schedule. The cumulative effect of the breakpoint schedule at 
asset levels from $0 to $230 billion is shown in Exhibit 4. 
 
 
The most striking feature of Exhibit 4 is that its shape is very 
similar to the hypothetical cost curve presented in Exhibit 1. This is no 
accident. Mutual fund sponsors are incentivized to maximize revenues 
and profits for their shareholders. This could be achieved above by just 
maintaining a flat 50 basis point advisory fee at all asset levels. The only 
brake on this behavior is the profit margin ceiling of about 75 percent set 
by the Schuyt precedent. The most likely cause of the shape of the 
advisory fee curve is that as assets increase and economies of scale are 
realized, CRMC was forced to lower fees at the margin in order to stay 
under the mandated ceiling.  
                                                          
110 Id.    
111 In re American Mut. Funds Fee Litigation, supra note 93, at *9. 
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The above interpretation is consistent with Propositions 1 and 3 
in the theoretical section on economies of scale. The advisory function is 
subject to substantial economies of scale and, due to the shape of the cost 
curve, fund sponsors are incentivized to only reduce fees slightly at 
higher assets levels.  
Give the breakpoint schedule, advisory fees fall from 50 basis 
points at $1 billion in assets to 30 basis points at $55 billion in assets, a 
forty percent decrease. However, fees fall from 30 basis points to 26.3 
basis points at $210 billion, a 12.3 percent drop. Given the flatness of the 
cost curve, fund sponsors lower fees at a slower rate at higher levels of 
assets and Exhibit 4 confirms this.  
 
 B. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P. 
In Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., an excessive fee case filed under 
§36(b), Harris Associates charged the Oakmark Fund greater advisory 
fees than it charged institutional clients for similar services.112 However, 
the District Court gave great weight to the comparison of the Oakmark 
Fund advisory fees to advisory fees charged by similar mutual funds113 
                                                          
112 See Jones v Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13352, at *1–3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007).  “The Oakmark Fund 
paid Harris Associates 1% (per year) of the first $2 billion of the fund's 
assets, 0.9% of the next $1 billion, 0.8% of the next $2 billion, and 
0.75% of anything over $5 billion.”  Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 
F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2008).  “For a client with investment goals 
similar to Oakmark Fund, Harris Associates charges 0.75% of the first 
$15 million under management and 0.35% of the amount over $500 
million, with intermediate break-points.”  Note how initially the 
institutional fees were quite high but aggressive breakpoints soon had the 
fee down to 35 basis points above $500 million.”  Id. 
113 Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13352, at *24 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007).  The Appellate Court in 
Gartenberg questioned the validity of comparing fees on a no-bid 
contract to fees on similar no-bid contracts and held: “Competition…for 
shareholder business does not support an inference that competition must 
therefore also exist between adviser-managers for fund business.  The 
former may be vigorous even though the latter is virtually non-existent.  
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and granted summary judgment for the defendants.114 
 
 C. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P. – Seventh Circuit 
Decisions  
 
The plaintiffs in Jones appealed to the Seventh Circuit and Judge 
Easterbrook, writing for the panel, issued a potentially game changing 
ruling. Based in large part on the CH research, the panel disapproved the 
Gartenberg approach: 
 
[T]he fact “that mutual funds are ‘captives’ of 
investment advisers does not curtail… competition.  An 
adviser can't make money from its captive fund if high 
fees drive investors away… Therefore, just as plaintiffs 
are skeptical of Gartenberg because it relies too heavily 
on markets, we are skeptical about Gartenberg because 
it relies too little on markets.”115 
 
And, referencing Coates Hubbard: 
 
A recent, careful study concludes that thousands of 
mutual funds are plenty, that investors can and do 
protect their interests by shopping, and that regulating 
advisory fees through litigation is unlikely to do more 
good than harm… It won't do to reply that most 
investors are unsophisticated and don't compare prices. 
The sophisticated investors who do shop create a 
competitive pressure that protects the rest.116 
 
The Appellate Court ruled that as long as the fiduciary made full 
disclosure and played no tricks then a cap on compensation ala 
                                                                                                                                  
Each is governed by different forces. Reliance on prevailing industry 
advisory fees will not satisfy §36(b).” Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset 
Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 929 (1982). 
114 Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13352, at *27-28 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007). 
115 Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008). 
116 Id. at 634 (citing Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence 
and Implications for Policy, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 151 (2007)). 
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Gartenberg is inappropriate. This represents a radical departure from the 
Gartenberg Standard. 
A judge called for a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc 
and a majority did not favor rehearing.  Five judges dissented from the 
denial of rehearing en banc and Judge Posner wrote the dissent in which 
he noted: "The panel bases its rejection of Gartenberg mainly on an 
economic analysis that is ripe for reexamination on the basis of growing 
indications that executive compensation in large publicly traded firms 
often is excessive because of the feeble incentives of boards of directors 
to police compensation." 117 
And, in response to the assertion that an adviser cannot make 
money from a captive fund if high fees drive investors away, Judge 
Posner cited Freeman Brown: 
 
That's true; but will high fees drive investors away?  
“[T]he chief reason for substantial advisory fee level 
differences between equity pension fund portfolio 
managers and equity mutual fund portfolio managers is 
that advisory fees in the pension field are subject to a 
marketplace where arm's-length bargaining occurs. As a 
rule, [mutual] fund shareholders neither benefit from 
arm's-length bargaining nor from prices that approximate 
those that arm's-length bargaining would yield were it 
the norm.”118 
 
D. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P. – U.S. Supreme Court        
    Decision 
 
In March 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously overruled 
the District and Appellate Courts’ rulings on summary judgment in Jones 
and remanded the case to the District Court for trial.  
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Gartenberg as the proper 
standard for determining if a breach of fiduciary duty has occurred, 
noting that it may ”lack sharp analytical clarity, but we believe that it 
accurately reflects the compromise that is embodied in §36(b), and it has 
provided a workable standard for nearly three decades.”  The Supreme 
                                                          
117 Id. at 730. 
118 Id. at 731-32. 
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Court chose not to weigh in on the issue of competitiveness, reasoning 
that it was an issue to be handled by Congress.  However, the Supreme 
Court did acknowledge that institutional fees may be a valid comparison: 
 
[W]e do not think that there can be any categorical rule 
regarding the comparisons of the fees charged different 
types of clients… Instead, courts may give such 
comparisons the weight that they merit in light of the 
similarities and differences between the services that the 
clients in question require, but courts must be wary of 
inapt comparisons. . . there may be significant 
differences between the services provided by an 
investment adviser to a mutual fund and those it 
provides to a pension fund which are attributable to the 
greater frequency of shareholder redemptions in a 
mutual fund, the higher turnover of mutual fund assets, 
the more burdensome regulatory and legal obligations, 
and the higher marketing costs. If the services rendered 
are sufficiently different that a comparison is not 
probative, then courts must reject such a comparison. 
Even if the services provided and the fees charged to an 
independent fund are relevant, courts should be mindful 
that the Act does not necessarily ensure fee parity 
between mutual funds and institutional clients contrary 
to petitioners' [plaintiffs'] contentions.119 
 
The statement encapsulates the confusion and lack of analytical 
clarity of the judicial system concerning the comparative costs of 
providing advisory services to institutional and mutual fund clients. The 
costs of providing all services (not just advisory services) are clearly 
different but the costs of providing advisory services are substantially the 
same. The confusion reflects the success of the industry in clouding the 
issues with processing costs, starting with Gartenberg and continuing to 
this day. It is useful to parse the Supreme Court language in regards to 
redemptions, turnover, regulatory obligations and marketing costs 
carefully. 
It is true that there is a higher frequency of shareholder 
redemptions (and purchases) for mutual funds than for pension funds. 
This does not mean that it is more expensive to provide advisory services 
                                                          
119 Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 350 (2009). 
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to mutual funds. The costs of processing frequent shareholder purchases 
and redemptions are paid under a separate transfer agent contract and the 
advisor is insulated from these costs.  
For mutual funds of any size the law of large numbers insures 
that purchases and redemptions will typically cancel or nearly cancel on 
a daily basis. In order to handle mismatches of purchases and 
redemptions the typical mutual fund portfolio will hold higher cash 
balances, on average than the typical institutional portfolio for the same 
type portfolio.  The higher cash balances will impact the return of the 
mutual fund portfolio, vis-a-vie the institutional portfolio, but not the 
costs of providing portfolio management services. The management of 
cash flows including dividend reinvestment, trading and rebalancing is 
part in parcel of the portfolio management process and there are no 
significant cost differences between mutual fund and institutional 
portfolios. 120  
It is true that shareholder purchases and redemptions may 
occasionally cause higher turnover vis-a-vie institutional portfolios. 
However, trading costs (commissions and market impact) influence 
portfolio costs and returns directly and do not impact on the costs of 
advisory services. 
There are clearly more burdensome regulatory and legal 
obligations involved in managing mutual fund portfolios as compared to 
institutional portfolios. One incremental cost is the requirement that 
mutual fund portfolios mark to market on a daily basis.  Another is the 
costs of reports to regulators not required of institutional money 
managers. However, such incremental costs are subject to economies of 
scale and are likely to be small. Freeman, Brown, and Pomerantz 
estimate these incremental costs as in the neighborhood of 3 basis points. 
Again, the Vanguard comparison provides a useful benchmark. If such 
cost were substantial they would be reflected in higher advisory fees for 
Vanguard funds as compared to institutional portfolios.    
Finally, the Supreme Court’s concerns about higher marketing 
costs for mutual funds may be exactly backward. Mutual fund marketing 
costs are covered under separate distribution fees and contracts while 
                                                          
120 Freeman et al., supra note 85. The most telling argument against cost 
differences in providing liquidity is that Vanguard fees are comparable to 
institutional fees and Vanguard funds must cope with frequent 
shareholders purchases and redemptions. 
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marketing costs for institutional managers are not. Thus, it may cost 
more to market and manage institutional portfolios than is costs to 
manage mutual fund portfolios.  
 
IX. CONCLUSION  
The Gartenberg precedent continues to be the law of the land 
and the industry views the decision in Jones as a victory.  Dan Pollack 
thinks so. In an article entitled, “Is the Supreme Court the ‘new best 
friend’ of the Fund Industry?" 121 he says:    
 
The mutual fund industry can now exhale: it has found a 
"new best friend" in Justice Samuel Alito and the 
Supreme Court.  After months of uncertainty and anxiety 
in the industry over the possible outcome of Jones v. 
Harris Associates, the Supreme Court last week issued a 
17-page Opinion, re-affirming 30 years of unbroken 
precedent on how courts are to judge whether advisory 
fees are excessive.  Gartenberg, long the standard in this 
area, was solidly endorsed by Justice Alito, writing for a 
unanimous Court, with Justice Clarence Thomas 
concurring. 
In its Opinion, the Supreme Court implicitly rejects 
(without naming them) the dueling theorists at the 
opposite ends of the spectrum: Freeman and Brown on 
the left; Hubbard and Coates on the right. 
 
Freeman and Brown, in an obscure122 law review article, 
provided the "intellectual" underpinnings of the 
plaintiffs  bar's attack on Gartenberg and on the several 
cases tried to judgment after Gartenberg… Hubbard and 
Coates contended, to the contrary, that in view of the 
industry's competitive nature, there cannot, as a matter of 
economic theory, be excessive fees since those charging 
                                                          
121 Daniel A. Pollack, Is the Supreme Court the “new best friend” of the 
Fund Industry?, https://perma.cc/G9K4-QANL. 
122 Mr. Pollack describes the FB article as an “obscure” law review 
article although the CH article was published in the same law review, 
The Journal of Corporation Law.  It seems that an article is not 
“obscure” when published by fellow Ivy Leaguers. 
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excessive fees would be driven out of business by those 
charging fair fees.  
 
Both positions, each rooted in economic theory, were 
shunted aside by the Supreme Court. The justices stayed 
solidly within the bounds of Gartenberg and the case 
law post-Gartenberg. 
 
Mr. Pollack’s victory lap may be a bit premature. While 
affirming the Gartenberg Standard, the US Supreme Court did not 
categorically reject the comparison of mutual fund and institutional 
advisory fees. The fog of processing costs that clouded Gartenberg and 
succeeding cases was highlighted by the decision and this paper should 
clarify the matter. Absent the processing cost canard, the Gartenberg 
Standard is formidable but not insurmountable.    
Consider, Freeman and Brown found that mutual fund advisory 
fees were, on average double institutional fees and that corresponding 
mutual fund portfolios were much larger. Absent the diversionary crutch 
of processing costs, on average mutual fund advisory fees are so 
disproportionately large that they bear no reasonable relationship to the 
services provided and could not have been the product of arm’s length 
negotiation. Double is disproportionate. Double is unreasonable. Courts 
could and should recognize this and test fees relative to fees truly 
determined at arm’s length, namely Vanguard and other fees determined 
by the interaction of market forces.  
The most important contribution of this paper is the analytical 
clarity it brings in the realm of mutual fund advisory fees. The use of 
institutional fees as a proxy for those determined by arm-length 
negotiation is now unambiguously appropriate with suitable adjustments 
for differences in the services provided. Similarly, the notion that 
economies of scale and profits margins are intimately related offers a 
powerful insight into the economics of advisory fees. The canard that 
economies of scale are best viewed over a narrow range of assets has 
been here exposed. 
In 1970, total mutual fund assets were less than $48 billion; 
today they are about $16 trillion. Based on the FB estimates, the 
overcharging of advisory fees currently amounts to about $35 billion per 
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year.123 This transfer of wealth from investors to mutual fund sponsors 
thus has serious public policy implications.   
 
                                                          
123 This is based on $16 trillion in mutual fund assets and the end of 2014 
less $2.5 trillion in Vanguard Fund assets multiplied times the FB 
estimate of 26 basis points of overcharging. 
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